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ESSAY
THE DALKON SHIELD CLAIMANTS TRUST:
PARADIGM LOST (OR FOUND)?
GEORGENE M. VAIRO *
In this Essay, Dean Vairo discusses the policies and procedures governing the
Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust After raising questions about the Trust's experi-
ence in a theoretical and jurisprudential contex Dean Vairo describes the histor-
ical development of the Trust and provides a preliminary asesment of the
Trust's performance. Dean Vairo addresses various criticisms of the Trust and
calls for a reasoned analysis of the Trust's policies in light of the theoretical ques-
tions raised in this Essay to determine whether the Trust should be considered as
a model for resolving other mass tort cases.
INTRODUCTION
7j'HE A.H. Robins Plan of Reorganization' (the "Plan") established a
settlement fund with more than $2.3 billion2 to compensate the
thousands of women and men who claimed injuries resulting from the
use of the Dalkon Shield Intrauterine Device.' The Plan, which was ne-
gotiated and agreed to by all the parties to the Robins reorganization,
provided for the establishment of the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust
("Trust") and a Claims Resolution Facility ("CRF") to be run by an
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law;
Chairperson, Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust. I am very grateful to my colleagues Maria
Marcus, Michael Martin and Sol Schreiber for their thoughtful comments on prior drafts
of this Essay. I also would like to thank my research assistant, Andrew Gordon, Class of
1994, for his valuable assistance.
1. See Debtor's Sixth Amended and Restated Plan of Reorganization, In re A.H.
Robins Co. (No. 85-01307-R), in Sixth Amended and Restated Disclosure Statement
Pursuant to Section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code (March 28, 1988) [hereinafter Plan].
2. See id. § 5.01; see also Agreement and Plan of Merger Dated as of March 21,
1988, among A.H. Robins Company, Incorporated, American Home Products Corpora-
tion and AHIP Subsidiary (9) Corporation § 6.12(a), In re A.H. Robins Co. (No. 85-
01307-R), in Sixth Amended and Restated Disclosure Statement Pursuant to Section
1125 of the Bankruptcy Code.
3. The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust was established as part of the Plan of Reor-
ganization of the A.H. Robins Company. See Sixth Amended and Restated Disclosure
Statement Pursuant to Section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. E.D. Va. Mar. 28,
1988) (No. 85-01307-R) [hereinafter Disclosure Statement], confirmed, In re A.H. Robins
Co., 88 B.R. 742 (E.D. Va. 1988), aff'd, 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Menard-Sanford v. A.H. Robins Co., 493 U.S. 959 (1989).
A brief history of the Dalkon Shield and the Chapter II case is set forth in In re A.H.
Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 711-22 (4th Cir.) [hereinafter Robins 11], cert. denied sub nom.
Anderson v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 493 U.S. 959 (1989). Other details regarding
the A.H. Robins bankruptcy case are explained in In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742
(E.D. Va. 1988) [hereinafter Breland], aff'd, 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Menard-Sanford v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 493 U.S. 959 (1989). See also Tetuan v.
A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1218-24 (Kan. 1987) (affirming S1.75 million compen-
satory and $7.5 million punitive jury award).
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independent Board of Trustees.4 In four years as a Trustee of the Dalkon
Shield Claimants Trust,' I have had little time to reflect fully on the
larger implications of the Trust's claims resolution process.
The purpose of this Essay is threefold. First, the time has come to
consider the Trust's policies and procedures in a larger theoretical and
jurisprudential context. Specifically, the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust
experience raises questions in at least three broad areas of inquiry: pro-
fessional ethics, law and economics, and feminist jurisprudence. Part I of
this Essay raises, but does not begin to answer, some of the questions that
ought to be kept in mind as one considers the Trust's policies, procedures
and experience, which are discussed in Parts II and III of this Essay.
The second purpose is to provide a history of the Trust. To that end,
Part II of this Essay describes the origins of the massive litigation prob-
lem and the formulation of a bankruptcy solution. Part III details how
the Trustees acted to implement the Reorganization Plan.
The third purpose of this Essay is to provide a preliminary assessment
of the Trust. Thus, Part IV discusses various criticisms of the Trust,
suggests that the Trust will be successful in resolving a large number of
claims fairly and efficiently, and argues that the Trust should be consid-
ered as a model for resolving other mass tort cases.
I. JURISPRUDENTIAL CONSIDERATIONS
In implementing the Plan and establishing the claims resolution pro-
cess, the Trustees were motivated, quite consciously, by a number of fac-
tors. The Trustees' decision-making always was driven by efficiency
considerations in an effort to maximize the resources available for claim-
ant recoveries. The vast majority of these claimants are women, and less
than thirty percent of the claimants were represented by counsel. Thus,
it also was clear that this claimant population might make a difference in
terms of decisions the Trustees would make or shape, and in terms of
how others might react to those decisions.
The Trustees' study of pre-bankruptcy litigation demonstrated that, in
general, a claimant's recovery had less to do with the merits than one
would hope or expect. The Trustees also knew that many Dalkon Shield
claimants felt victimized by the legal process and by lawyers both before
and during the bankruptcy process.6 As a result, the Trustees tried to
4. The Claimants Trust Agreement authorizes the Trustees to set up a claims resolu-
tion process to resolve the claims of those who timely notified the court of their intention
to seek compensation. See Claimants Trust Agreement § 2.02, In re A.H. Robins Co.
(No. 85-01307-R), in Sixth Amended and Restated Disclosure Statement Pursuant to
Section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code (Mar. 28, 1988) [hereinafter CTR].
5. See infra notes 61-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of the selection of
the original five Trustees, the removal of three of these Trustees, and the appointment of
new Trustees.
6. See Karen M. Hicks, Dalkon Shield IUD Survivors: A Case Study of Contracep-
tive Tragedy and an Emerging Social Protest Movement, 1986-1989 (1990) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Pa., on file with the Fordham Law Review). Ms. Hicks
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develop a system that made claimants less dependent on external forces,
and more in a position to handle their claims themselves if they so chose.
This development, in turn, reduced the role and importance of lawyers.7
These basic considerations implicate at least three broad jurispruden-
tial areas: professional ethics, feminist jurisprudence, and law and eco-
nomics. No attempt will be made here to analyze fully the Trust's
experience in these areas. Rather, this part of the Essay raises important
questions that I will explore in future articles.
A. Professional Ethics
The way in which some lawyers obtain and represent Dalkon Shield
clients raises serious questions of professional ethics. For example, nine
lawyers or law firms represent over 10,000 Option 3 claimants.' Can one
attorney or firm properly serve hundreds, let alone thousands, of clients?9
When counseling client A, is an attorney's judgment clouded by his or
her fee expectations in other cases? Is the usual advice given in a product
liability case appropriate in an essentially administrative system for
resolving claims? Are contingent fees ranging from twenty-four to fifty
founded the Dalkon Shield Information Network, perhaps the largest support group for
unrepresented Dalkon Shield claimants, through which she sought to participate in the
bankruptcy process. The dissertation provides a history of the group and its attempts to
participate fully in the bankruptcy process, and to become a political and social force for
change in the methods for handling mass tort litigation.
The dissertation shows the difficulties the Dalkon Shield Information Network had on
a number of fronts. For instance, Ms. Hicks describes the necessity for the group: there
were few if any attempts, even by the creditors committee representing the interests of the
Dalkon Shield Claimants, to keep the claimants themselves apprised of the legal proceed-
ings. See id. at 75-76, 97-98, 105. She also discusses how, instead of supporting her
efforts, various plaintiffs' lawyers tried to co-opt her group. See id. at 150-61. Few wo-
men's groups provided assistance or support. See id. at 97, 145-47.
Ms. Hicks also argues that the activities of many lawyers led to "revictimization" of
those injured by the Dalkon Shield. See id at 168-69.
7. This reduced role for lawyers is especially evident during the claims resolution
part of the process. See infra Part II.A-B and accompanying text for a discussion of the
claims resolution process.
8. Twenty-five thousand Option 3 claimants are represented by lawyers handling
more than 10 Dalkon Shield claims. Over 11,000 Option 3 claimants are not represented
by counsel. The Plan contemplates that Option 3 be elected by those claimants with the
most serious Dalkon Shield injuries. See infra Part II.B.2.d.
9. Articles on the Dalkon Shield case indicate that some lawyers are representing
thousands of Dalkon Shield claimants. See, eg., Paul Blustein, How Two Young Lawyers
Got Rich by Settling IUD Liability Claims, Wall St. J., Feb. 24, 1982, at 1 (reporting on
two plaintiffs' attorneys representing over 900 claimants); Malcolm Gladwell, Latest
Fight In a Long Case: Attorney Fees; Victims' Lawyers Getting Too Much, Critics Con-
tend, Wash. Post, Jan. 22, 1989, at HI (attorney representing 1000 Dalkon Shield claim-
ants and still searching for more); Women Reject Settlement Offers From Stingy Dalkon
Shield Trust, Atlanta J. & Const., Nov. 14, 1991, at D4 (attorney representing 1000 cli-
ents). With lawyers representing such large numbers of claimants, obvious questions
arise-notably, whether these lawyers even have the time for individual communication
or consultation with their clients. See Jack B. Weinstein, A View From the Judiciary, 13
Cardozo L. Rev. 1957, 1963 (1992); Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect
of Equity on Mass Tort Law, 1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. 269, 325 (1991).
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percent for settling Dalkon Shield claims appropriate if a claim is settled
without the need for negotiation or formal dispute resolution?"0
When there is a fixed compensation pool, do attorneys have any duty
to those who are unrepresented? Do they have any duty to their other
clients? How far should attorneys go in "cooperating" with the Trust?
How can attorneys who represent numerous claimants fairly advise cli-
ents who have obtained the first offers when the attorneys may owe a
considerable amount to lenders who have carried them while waiting for
settlements to be administered?1 Is there a need for courts to supervise
lawyers' conduct and fee structures when lawyers are representing hun-
dreds or thousands of claimants against one defendant?
Typically, the federal class action rule, and similar state provisions,
protect the interests of class members when hundreds or thousands of
persons have similar claims. 2 In the Dalkon Shield claims resolution
process, many lawyers have hundreds, and even thousands, of clients.
Like the Dalkon Shield claims process, many large class actions feature
10. Most claims are settled on this basis, on the forms submitted and medical records,
rather than by negotiation or formal dispute resolution. The contingent fee arrangement
is supposed to shift risks from the client to the attorney-the high risk of litigating justi-
fies a high fee. Commentators have criticized the use of high contingent fee arrangements
in claims resolution, as opposed to litigation, contexts because the high risk does not
exist. See Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is There A Need For An Ad-
ministrative Alternative?, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 1819, 1837 (1992) [hereinafter Brickman,
Asbestos Litigation Crisis]; Lester Brickman, Contingency Fees Without Contingencies:
Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmark, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 29, 74 (1989) [hereinafter
Brickman, Contingency Fees]; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Liti-
gation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev.
877, 889-94 (1987). Charging high contingent fees but not assuming any risk is arguably
unethical. See Brickman, Asbestos Litigation Crisis, supra, at 1837 (calling it "illegal and
unethical" as well as "grossly exorbitant" to collect contingent fees under such circum-
stances); Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra, at 53 (charging 33 to 40% contingency fee is
violative of "the fiduciary obligation to deal fairly with the client" when risk of
nonrecovery is low).
In the case of a properly screened Dalkon Shield claim, risk of nonrecovery is minimal.
Lawyers know exactly how much they can expect from any single Option 1 or Option 2
claim simply by checking the Trust's damages schedules. Although it is possible to re-
cover from $125 to over a $1,000,000 in Option 3, the medical evidence, and not the skill
of the lawyer in "presenting" a claim, is determinative. See infra Part II.E.3. Arguably,
the lawyer's skill and "risk" factors are relevant only if the claimant rejects the Option 3
offer and elects trial or arbitration. One commentator, in describing the asbestos claim
resolution process, noted that it is "unfathomable... why lawyers continue to be paid on
a contingency basis since the processing of asbestos claims has become relatively simple."
Christopher P. Lu, Procedural Solutions to the Attorney's Fee Problem in Complex Litiga-
tion, 26 U. Rich. L. Rev. 41, 49 (1991). Although the medical issues are not always
simple, the claims resolution process in the Dalkon Shield is very straightforward. See
infra Part III.A.2.F.
11. See, e.g., Gladwell, supra note 9, at HI. A plaintiff's lawyer with a multitude of
clients dismissed criticisms of his high contingent fees by stating he had his own financial
concerns to worry about. In representing his Dalkon Shield claimants, the lawyer be-
came $1 million in debt and paid $100,000 a year in interest.
12. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for adequate representation of class
members to protect the due process interests of the class and of the adversary. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23.
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contingency fees and a limited compensation fund. Should courts analo-
gize such representation to class actions to protect the due process inter-
est of the clients? 3
The ethical issues are not confined to lawyers' behavior. How can
Trustees, who are charged to act as fiduciaries, do so knowing that at
least some subset of claimants will become adversaries? Do Trustees owe
a higher duty to some claimants than others? For example, the Plan
provides for Late Claimants14 to receive payments if money is left over
after all timely claimants are paid.' 5 Do Trustees owe a higher duty to
timely claimants?
B. Feminist Jurisprudence
The essence of the Trustees' policies is to maximize the benefits ac-
corded to the group of claimants as a whole. The Trustees knew that
their policies might not benefit particular individuals to the maximum
degree that might have been expected in a single tort case. Although the
Trustees' decisions were not consciously made from a feminist perspec-
tive, it seems obvious on reflection that their policies may very well fit
into a feminist theoretical or jurisprudential context. 6 This dimension
13. See e.g., Brickman, Contingency Fees, supra note 10, at 65 (stating "[c]ontingent
fee retainer agreements require... unparalleled judicial supervision"); Weinstein & Her-
shenov, supra note 9, at 289 ("[Wjith a limited compensation fund, court control over
fees... is desirable."). Courts, however, have been reluctant to assume this function.
See, eg., Brickman, Asbestos Litigation Crisis, supra note 10, at 1838 n.72 (there is a
"virtual complete failure of the courts to exercise superintendence"); Coffee, supra note
10, at 897 ("IT]he general attitude of courts... has been one of benign neglect."); Wein-
stein, supra note 9, at 1963 ("[A]s judges, we do not want to get involved in fees and
supervision of lawyers.").
As noted above, the courts generally do not become involved in overseeing attorneys
fee. The only exception is the class action, where judges do, in fact, act as guardians of
the class members' interests with respect to attorneys fees. See Lu, supra note 10, at 61;
Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 9, at 326. In class actions, due process demands that
judges protect the interests of absent class members. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32,
45 (1940). Because of the inherent difficulties a lawyer has in assisting hundreds of clients
with their claims, such clients are in a similar position as class members, particularly
through the claims resolution process. Accordingly, the due process rationale for requir-
ing court supervision may well apply to the Dalkon Shield claimants. As discussed ear-
lier, many claimants are represented by lawyers with thousands of clients, making
individual contact extremely difficult. Further, requiring a claimant to pay a large con-
tingency fee to a lawyer who has provided little assistance with her claim undermines her
satisfaction with her settlement offer.
14. Late Claimants are those who filed claims after the Bar Date. See infra Part
II.B.l.a.
15. Late Claimants will be paid on a subordinated basis if there is money to pay after
all timely claimants are paid in full. See Dalkon Shield Trust Claims Resolution Facility
§ G(14), In re A.H. Robins Co. (No. 85-01307-R), in Sixth Amended and Restated Dis-
closure Statement Pursuant to Section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code (Mar. 28, 1988)
[hereinafter CRF].
16. See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. Legal
Educ. 3, 4-12 (1988) [hereinafter Bender, A Lawyer's Primer].
Professor Bartlett describes the feminist legal method as: (i) asking the "woman ques-
tion" to see how women and other groups have been excluded and what difference this
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too needs to be explored in detail. While there is clearly no single "femi-
nist jurisprudence,"' 7 many feminist scholars seem to agree that femi-
nism should lead to less of an emphasis on maximizing an individual's
position in an effort to preserve or protect the good of the whole.'"
Not all schools of feminist thought encourage the values of interdepen-
dence and cooperation within the community because these values argua-
bly make women subject to male oppression and domination.' 9 The
Trust's model, however, does not implicate the problems of oppression
and domination. Rather, the Trust views the claimant pool as a commu-
nity, mutually dependent and interconnected. The Trust's approach, as
seen in its policies, ensures that cooperation and interpersonal responsi-
bility are the norm.
Rather than the traditional "male" model or "competitive, win-lose
approach" to dispute resolution,20 the Trust's approach avoids a system
in which claimants, through their attorneys, vie with each other for a
settlement jackpot, to the detriment of later claimants and unrepresented
claimants. Instead, the Trust sought to develop a system that would
treat all claims fairly and equally by equalizing the position of repre-
sented and unrepresented claimants and by encouraging settlements that
makes; (ii) using feminist practical reasoning to delineate the real human issues involved,
rather than abstract legal principles, from the vantage point of the excluded; and (iii)
utilizing consciousness-raising to gain knowledge of a collective experience of oppression
through the sharing of individual, personal experiences. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Femi-
nist Legal Methods, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 829, 833-36, 837, 849, 863 (1990). The Trust
incorporates many aspects of this methodology. As will be discussed, the Trustees con-
centrated on evaluating how policies and procedures would affect the injured women (and
men), especially those without legal representation, as a group. See infra Part III.C-D;
see also Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. Rev.
659, 687 (1989) ("[Dalkon Shield] claimants seemed to relish the opportunity to tell their
own stories.").
17. Feminist jurisprudence is far from a single, unitary theory. See Leslie Bender,
Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibili-
ties, 1990 Duke L.J. 848, 850 n.7 (1990) [hereinafter Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts]; Linda
J. Lacey, Introducing Feminist Jurisprudence: An Analysis of Oklahoma's Seduction Stat-
ute, 25 Tulsa L.J. 775, 779 (1990); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1, 13 (1988). In general, feminist jurisprudence can be divided into three "schools of
thought": liberal feminism (supporting traditional notions equating feminism with equal-
ity), radical feminism (focusing on the power relationship between men and women and
male subordination of women), and cultural feminism (that there is a "distinctively femi-
nine way of approaching moral and legal dilemmas" that has been undervalued in tradi-
tional legal doctrine and scholarship). See Cass R. Sunstein, Feminism and Legal Theory,
101 Harv. L. Rev. 826, 827 (1988); see also Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice 173-74
(1982) (women's morality focuses on ethics of care and nonviolence).
18. Many feminist jurisprudentialists view the values of cooperation and connection
as central to any theory of feminism. See Lacey, supra note 17, at 783; Suzanna Sherry,
Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 Va. L. Rev. 543,
584-85 (1986); West, supra note 17, at 14.
19. See West, supra note 17, at 28-29; see also Lacey, supra note 17, at 791 ("[W]hile
cultural feminists celebrate connection and relationships .... [r]adical feminists believe
that cultural feminism perpetuates the pattern of women's subordination by affirming
traits that contribute to women's willing collaboration with their oppressors.").
20. See Bender, A Lawyer's Primer, supra note 16, at 7.
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would give the highest possible amount to each individual claimant, va-
rying according to the strength of the medical evidence, without deplet-
ing the funds necessary to treat all remaining claims in the same manner.
The Trust's approach, in light of these feminist principles, also
presents an opportunity to question the distinction between public and
private law, as well as the claimant's role in this kind of dispute.2
Because of the implications of mass tort disasters for the general pub-
lic, courts cannot continue to view private mass tort litigation as merely
settling a private dispute.' Neither should the parties involved maintain
such a view. Both tortfeasor and injured plaintiff should begin to view
themselves in terms of the community.' Public law should force
tortfeasors, notably large corporations, to realize the implications of im-
posing harm on the community. At the same time, injured plaintiffs
should realize their position in protecting that very same community.24
In considering whether plaintiffs would sacrifice maximum recoveries in
order to protect their community, one problem that might arise is the
role of the lawyer. Lawyers, too, should re-examine their role in an inter-
dependent, cooperative community and avoid letting fee considerations
interfere with the fulfillment of that role.
Another aspect of the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust experience needs
to be examined. At the inception of the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust,
only about twenty-nine percent of the claimants were represented by
counsel. By the time the Trust began paying the larger claims, over sixty
percent were unrepresented. Were the injuries suffered by the women
trivialized by lawyers? Do women have less access to legal services? Or
did the procedures established by the Trust make legal representation
unnecessary?
C. Law and Economics
The Trust's policies were designed to achieve as many settlements as
possible in order to avoid more costly and time-consuming traditional
21. Much has been written on the problems associated with the distinction between
public and private law. See Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts, supra note 17, at 864-68; Ken-
neth Casebeer, Toward a Critical Jurisprudence-A First Step by Way of the Public-Pri-
vate Distinction in Constitutional Law, 37 U. Miami L. Rev. 379 (1983); David
Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases" A "Public Law" Vision of
the Tort System, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 851 (1984).
22. See Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts, supra note 17, at 868 (tortfeasors "imposing risks
on the public.., and ... coping with the harms resulting from those risks are public
questions of the highest order"); David G. Owen, Deterrence and Desert in Tort: A Com-
ment, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 665, 666-67 (1985) (stating that tort law is "often public in its spirit
and effect"); Rosenberg, supra note 21, at 901 ("a claims's deterrence value is . . . a
'public good' ").
23. See Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts, supra note 17, at 866; Rosenberg, supra note 21,
at 907-08.
24. See Rosenberg, supra note 21, at 907 ("[P]ublic law litigation thus seeks to
achieve the benefits of deterrence by sacrificing some of the benefits of individualized
treatment of claims.").
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dispute resolution techniques, such as negotiation, formal arbitration, or
trial. Although it is too early to determine whether the Trust will
achieve its goal, it will be interesting to see how our decisions and experi-
ence measure up from a law and economics perspective25 and from a
game theory perspective.26 It will be interesting indeed to determine
whether the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust represents a successful mar-
riage of law and economics principles and feminist jurisprudence,
although scholars in both camps may find such a notion alarming.27
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
A. Pre-Bankruptcy28
In the late 1960s, the public became alarmed about the side effects of
the birth control pill.29 As a consequence, the medical community
mounted an effort to develop non-chemical, presumably safer methods of
birth control. One method that received renewed attention was the in-
trauterine device ("IUD"). A doctor and an engineer developed the
Dalkon Shield and claimed that it had a very high rate of preventing
unwanted pregnancies.30 In 1970, A.H. Robins acquired the rights to
25. See Charles J. Goetz, Cases and Materials on Law and Economics (1984); Rich-
ard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (3d ed. 1986). In essence, a law and econom-
ics perspective seeks to utilize economic concepts in analyzing the law to promote
economic efficiency. See Posner, supra, at 20-22. For a more general overview of the law
and economics movement, see Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980's,
50 Ohio St. L.J. 599, 604-14 (1989).
26. See Roger B. Myerson, Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict (1991); Eric Ras-
musen, Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory (1989). Game theory
analysis uses "games"-such as prisoner's dilemma or the zero-sum game-to illustrate
human behavior when faced with the choice to cooperate or not. For a general overview
of this theory, see Carol M. Rose, Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78
Va. L. Rev. 421, 424-28 (1992).
27. See, e.g., Michael Distelhorst, Judging Ourselves as Heirs to the Realist Insight:
The Role of Ethics as a Bridge Between Law and Life, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 43, 59 (1991)
("these groups are not in any way philosophically interchangeable"); Minda, supra note
25, at 601 ("the ... movements appear to be fundamentally different"); Deborah L.
Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 617, 627 (1990) ("[T]he target.., in
some critical feminist analyses, is ... the version [of liberal legalism] favored by law and
economics commentators."). For a good example of the clashes between the two schools,
compare Richard A. Posner, The Ethical Significance ofFree Choice: A Reply to Professor
West, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1431 (1986), with Robin West, Submission, Choice, and Ethics: A
Rejoinder to Judge Posner, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1449 (1986) (debating a basic principle of
law and economics: voluntary, consensual transactions). Even Professor West, however,
noted the need "to cure our mutual ignorance" and to "talk across the descriptive and
normative divide." West, supra, at 1456. The Dalkon Shield Trust's policies may be a
good starting point to bridge the divide because the Trustees' policies encompassed basic
principles of law and economics as well as feminist thought. But see Distelhorst, supra, at
44 (arguing ethics as the bridge between competing philosophies of law).
28. For further background on the pre-bankruptcy period, see Disclosure Statement,
supra note 3, at 16-29.
29. See Richard B. Sobol, Bending the Law: The Story of the Dalkon Shield Bank-
ruptcy 1 (1991).
30. See id.
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the Dalkon Shield.
Robins began national marketing of the Dalkon Shield in January
1971. By the time it withdrew the product from the United States mar-
ket, Robins had distributed approximately 2.8 million Dalkon Shields in
the United States, and also had distributed about 1.7 million Dalkon
Shields to foreign countries. 3' Approximately 3.6 million women
throughout the world actually used the Dalkon Shield.32
In the 1970s, doctors began reporting various problems with the
Dalkon Shield. Women started filing lawsuits in state and federal courts
charging a variety of injuries linked to the Dalkon Shield, such as un-
wanted pregnancies, ectopic pregnancies, septic abortions, miscarriages,
and birth defects allegedly caused to fetuses when conception took place
with the Dalkon Shield in the woman's uterus. There also were com-
plaints about excessive bleeding and cramping, Pelvic Inflammatory Dis-
ease ("PID"), and complications arising from PID, including sterilizing
surgery and infertility. Many young women, who had not yet had chil-
dren, were injured.3 3 For obvious reasons, many of these cases had high
emotional value. In some instances, infections were so serious that
Dalkon Shield users died.
By the fall of 1975, Robins faced 286 complaints and could foresee the
coming crush of cases.34 By the end of 1975, a federal Multidistrict Liti-
gation Panel ("MDL") was convened to assist with Dalkon Shield cases.
The MDL ultimately transferred the federal Dalkon Shield cases to the
district court of Kansas for pretrial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1407
(1988). 3
Next, various federal Dalkon Shield cases were transferred to the
Northern District of California. By the end of 1979, thousands of cases
were pending nation-wide. The District Court in California tried what at
that time was a novel approach: After realizing that each Dalkon Shield
case would take at least a week to try, and realizing the potentially huge
exposure (estimated to be well over Robins' net worth because of the
claims for punitive damages), the court certified a nationwide class under
Rule 23(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the issue of
punitive damages, and a California class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure on the issues of liability and compensatory
31. See Special Note to Women Who Used the Dalkon Shield: How Your Dalkon
Shield Claims Will be Treated 16, In re A.H. Robins Co. (No. 85-01307-R), in Sixth
Amended and Restated Disclosure Statement Pursuant to Section 1125 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code (Mar. 28, 1988).
32. See id.
33. See One of Three Women Found Infertile, U.S. Affairs, June 14, 1985, Medicine &
Health, at B3.
34. See In re A.H. Robins Co., "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Lifig., 406 F.
Supp. 540, 540 (J.P.M.L. 1975).
35. See id at 542.
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damages.36 The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed. a7
At the same time, a securities class action (ultimately settled for $6.9
million) was filed in the Southern District of New York for Robins' al-
leged misrepresentations and failure to disclose other information about
the Dalkon Shield in Robins' financial statements.
Meanwhile, the number of lawsuits against Robins continued to in-
crease. Although Robins won jury verdicts in many of the early cases, as
certain sensitive documents38 were discovered, plaintiffs began to win,
and win big. For instance, in May 1985, a jury in the Tetuan case in
Kansas awarded compensatory damages of $1.75 million, and punitive
damages of $7.5 million.39 Although Robins and Aetna, its insurer, had
disposed of 9,500 suits, and had paid out approximately $530 million,
some 6,000 cases were still pending. Three months after Tetuan, Robins
filed for reorganization relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code.'
B. The Bankruptcy Case
Robins' bankruptcy was precipitated by the "avalanche of actions filed
in various state and federal courts throughout the United States... seek-
ing damages for injuries allegedly sustained by the use of an intrauterine
contraceptive device known as a Dalkon Shield.,, 4 1 The bankruptcy case
has been the subject of at least two books which focus on the various
relationships of the key players involved in the case.42 The main players
were: 1) United States District Judge Robert R. Merhige, Jr., who re-
tained jurisdiction over the case43 and jointly decided matters with bank-
ruptcy Judge Blackwell N. Shelley; 2) the Claimants Committee, led by
Murray Drabkin, at the time a partner at Cadwalader, Wickersham &
Taft; 3) the Robins family, who controlled the company; 4) Aetna Insur-
36. See In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F.
Supp. 887, 896 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub
nom. A.H. Robins Co. v. Abed, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
37. See In re Northern Dist. of California, Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig.,
693 F.2d 847, 856 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. A.H. Robins Co. v. Abed, 459
U.S. 1171 (1983).
38. A member of the Robins' legal department claimed that Robins destroyed docu-
ments relating to Dalkon Shield claims. He contended that he secretly saved copies of
some of these documents, which he ultimately produced. See Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co.,
738 P.2d 1210, 1223 (Kan. 1987).
39. See id. at 1210.
40. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. 11 1992).
41. A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 996 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
876 (1986).
42. See Morton Mintz, At Any Cost: Corporate Greed, Women, & the Dalkon
Shield (1985); Sobol, supra note 29.
43. Only federal judges appointed under Article III of the U.S. Constitution are per-
mitted to adjudicate "traditionally judicial" matters. See Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 76 (1982) (holding that bankruptcy judges could
not constitutionally adjudicate "inherently judicial" matters). The A.H. Robins reorgan-
ization implicated thousands of tort claims which are "inherently judicial" in nature.
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ance Company, Robins' insurance carrier, which was being sued for
fraud and RICO violations along with Robins after plaintiffs' lawyers
alleged that Robins and Aetna had conspired to withhold information
about the problems with the Dalkon Shield; and 5) American Home
Products, the company which eventually acquired Robins for more than
$3 billion, the bulk of which funded the Trust.'
The details regarding Robins' bankruptcy case are explained in the dis-
trict court opinion confirming the Plan,4" and in a series of Fourth Cir-
cuit decisions.' Robins' Plan was confirmed by order dated July 26,
1988 (the "Confirmation Order").47 The Confirmation Order established
the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust and called for its initial funding in
the amount of $100,000,000. 4 s After all appeals of the Confirmation Or-
der were finally resolved, the Plan was consummated on December 15,
1989 (the "Consummation Date"), at which time the Trust received ad-
ditional funds from American Home Products Corporation ("AHP"),
Robins and Aetna for a total of $2.33 billion.
1. Estimation Hearing
The estimation hearing was an important part of the bankruptcy case.
Its purpose was to estimate the amount of money that would be needed
to satisfy all valid Dalkon Shield Claims.
a. The Bar Date
The court initially needed to determine the number of claimants.
Early in the Chapter 11 case, the District Court fixed April 30, 1986, as
the deadline for filing claims against Robins (the "Bar Date").49 The
district court's order setting the Bar Date also established a simplified
two-step filing procedure for persons wishing to pursue Dalkon Shield
personal injury claims against Robins."0
44. See Robins II, supra note 3, 880 F.2d 709, 720-21 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Anderson v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 493 U.S. 959 (1989).
45. See Breland, supra note 3, 88 B.R. 742 (F-D. Va. 1988), aff'd, 880 F.2d 694 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied sub nor. Menard-Sanford v. A.H. Robins Co., 493 U.S. 954 (1989).
46. See In re A. H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 694, 696 n.1 (4th Cir. 1989) [hereinafter
Robins 1], cert. denied sub nor. Menard-Sanford v. A.H. Robins Co., 493 U.S. 959 (1989)
for a list of this series of Fourth Circuit decisions.
47. See id, at 696.
48. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Robins
III] .
49. See Vancouver Women's Health Collective Soc'y v. A. H. Robins Co., 820 F.2d
1359, 1360 (4th Cir. 1987).
50. First, claimants wishing to assert Dalkon Shield claims had to identify themselves
by submitting their name and address in writing on or before the Bar Date. Upon receipt,
the bankruptcy court entered that information into its computer records and sent the
claimants a two-page questionnaire. The second step entailed returning the questionnaire
to the court by June 30, 1986, for domestic claimants and by July 30, 1986, for foreign
claimants. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 862 F.2d 1092, 1093 (4th Cir. 1988) [hereinafter
Wiltz].
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
As a result of a worldwide notification campaign publicizing the Bar
Date, the Bankruptcy Court began receiving thousands of claims every
day beginning in January 1986. Although the notification campaign was
criticized, about 350,000 claims were filed by the Bar Date." About
300,000 American women and men filed claims, and roughly 35,000 for-
eign women and men filed claims. The clerk of the Bankruptcy Court
eventually ran triple shifts to process these claims.2
Following the receipt of these claims, the court mailed a brief ques-
tionnaire to the claimants which asked for basic information about the
claim. In the spring of 1987, the court mailed a second questionnaire to
all claimants who failed to return the initial court questionnaire. The
deadline for domestic claimants to mail the second questionnaire was
July 15, 1987. The deadline for foreign claimants was August 15, 1987.
Over 106,000 claimants failed to return the questionnaire, and those
claims were disallowed by the court. The court, however, gave all disal-
lowed claimants the opportunity to seek reinstatement of their claims.5"
In sum, this left the court the task of approximating how much would be
needed to pay the 197,000 active, timely claims.
b. Dalkon Shield Data Collection
In March 1986, Judge Merhige appointed Professor Francis McGov-
ern, a specialist in mass torts, to assist in developing a data base from
which the various parties in interest could approximate how much
money would be needed to compensate all valid claims. Court appointed
experts developed and sent a detailed questionnaire to a scientific sample
of claimants. The various parties used the data obtained to present to the
court their estimates of the funds necessary to pay all valid claims.
The estimates ranged from $7 hundred million (Robins' low end esti-
mate) to $7 billion (the Claimants Committee's high end estimate). The
Aetna expert estimated that the Trust would need $2.2 billion. Judge
Merhige determined that $2.475 billion, payable over a reasonable period
of time, would be needed to pay all valid Dalkon Shield claims and the
Trust's administrative expenses in full.
51. See id. at 1093.
52. Due to the great volume of claims filed, the court quickly outgrew its office space
and lacked the equipment necessary to maintain the enormous database of claim informa-
tion. To meet its expanding needs, the court created an annex to the clerk's office known
as the Dalkon Shield Records Center (the "DSRC"). The court staffed the DSRC with
more than fifty temporary and full-time employees who created and maintained separate
claim files for timely and late filed claims. Each claim file was pre-numbered and color
coded by claim number. Timely filed claim files are buff-colored and late filed claim files
are red. A claim file contains, inter alia, the claimant's original postcard or claim letter
and questionnaire. Throughout the claims process, the clerk's office and the DSRC con-
tinually audited files to verify names, addresses, claim dates and questionnaire return
dates.
53. See Wiltz, 862 F.2d at 1095, for a detailed discussion of the reinstatement process,
which involved a series of hearings and the participation of a Special Master.
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2. The Plan
The parties, including all unsecured trade creditors and equity security
holders, approved the Plan, which was made possible by American
Home Products' offer to purchase Robins for more than $3 billion. The
committee members' vote on the Plan was overwhelmingly positive. In-
deed, about ninety-four percent of voting Dalkon Shield claimants voted
in favor of the Plan. The district court formally confirmed the Plan in
July 1988.
The Plan was adopted because of one basic element-the idea of full
compensation to all creditors. Two other elements flowed from the ele-
ment of full compensation: (1) the channelling of all Dalkon Shield
claims to one compensation fund to achieve "Global Peace"; and (2) a
Trust to be run by independent Trustees appointed by the court.
a. Full Compensation
The creditors approved the Plan because they believed that there
would be sufficient money to pay all valid claims, including personal in-
jury claims. The disclosure statement made clear, however, that if the
money ran out, there would be no recourse against doctors, Aetna or
others.
b. "Global Peace"
A controversial aspect of the Plan was the idea of "Global Peace."
There were many parties to the bankruptcy litigation, and many defend-
ants were named in the pre-bankruptcy Dalkon Shield cases. These de-
fendants included: the A.H. Robins Company; members of the Robins
family and other high officials of the Robins Company; Aetna (Robins'
product liability carrier) which was accused of conspiring with Robins;
and doctors and hospitals accused of medical malpractice associated with
the use of the Dalkon Shield. The defendants all wanted the Chapter 11
case to result in the channelling of all pending and future Dalkon Shield
claims into the Trust.
While the bankruptcy case was pending, lawsuits against Aetna con-
tinued to brew. Eventually, Judge Merhige certified a Rule 23(b)(1) set-
tlement class in the Breland case against Aetna.' The settlement
provided two things: first, Aetna agreed to pay an additional $500 mil-
lion to the compensation fund for Dalkon Shield claimants, including
those whose claims were disallowed; and second, it resolved all Dalkon
Shield related claims for Aetna. 5
The Plan itself not only discharged the debtor, A.H. Robins, but it also
released the Robins family, company officials, and doctors or health care
providers who otherwise could have been sued for malpractice for claims
54. See Robins II, supra note 3, 880 F.2d 709, 715-23 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Anderson v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 493 U.S. 959 (1989).
55. See id. at 709.
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arising out of the insertion, removal or use of the Dalkon Shield by per-
manently enjoining such claims against them.
The Other Claimants Trust, which was to be funded with $50 million,
was available to pay doctors, hospitals or others who had claims for con-
tribution or indemnification against Robins. All personal injury claims
arising out of the use, insertion or removal of the Dalkon Shield were to
be filed against the $2.3 billion Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust.
Some plaintiffs' lawyers disagreed that there would be sufficient funds
to pay all personal injury claimants. Thus, they were concerned that
there would be no recourse against third parties such as doctors. Ac-
cordingly, these plaintiffs' lawyers appealed both the Breland class action
settlement and the injunction provisions against third parties. All ap-
peals, however, were unsuccessful. The Supreme Court denied certiorari
in the fall of 1989,56 and, in December 1989, the Plan was consummated
when American Home Products acquired A.H. Robins and remitted $2.3
billion to the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust.57
The Fourth Circuit specifically upheld the Plan's "Global Peace" as-
pect when it affirmed the Confirmation Order and approved the use of a
class action in the related Aetna Breland matter.58
c. The CRF and the Trust
The Plan authorized the court to appoint five Trustees to implement
the CRF.5 9 The CRF provided the format for setting up the claims facil-
ity in Richmond, Virginia.
The CRF provides for several settlement options. This section de-
scribes the purposes of the different options provided for in the CRF.
Part III of this Essay discusses how the Trustees implemented the CRF,
including the range of payments offered.
Option 1-The "Short Form/Instant Offer"
The responses to the questionnaires submitted in connection with the
estimation hearing made clear that many of the claims filed would be
frivolous or of relatively low value, such as a temporary heavy bleeding
claim. The purpose of Option 1 was to permit a quick clearing of such
claims.
Option 2-The "Claim Form/Tailored Offer"
Dalkon Shield litigation, like other mass tort litigation, presented cau-
56. See Menard-Sanford v. A.H. Robins Co., 493 U.S. 959 (1989).
57. See Alan Cooper, Way is Cleared for Robins Trust; Supreme Court Lets Plan
Stand, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 20, 1989, at 3; David Savage, Court Clears Way for Dalkon Shield
Payouts, L.A. Times, Nov. 7, 1989, at Al. The balance of the $2.457 billion necessary to
pay valid Dalkon Shield claims would come from members of the Robins family and
from Aetna.
58. See Robins I, supra note 46, 880 F.2d 694, 702 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Menard-Sanford v. A.H. Robins Co., 493 U.S. 959 (1989).
59. See CTR, supra note 4, § 3.01.
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sation issues. In the Dalkon Shield case, the global causation issue was
not too troublesome because medical experts agreed on the types of inju-
ries the Dalkon Shield could cause. In fact, the CRF provided an exhibit
which listed the various types of recognized Dalkon Shield injuries for
which the Trustees could authorize payment.
The possibility of alternative causation, however, was a real concern.
Medical evidence indicated that most of the injuries that were linked to
the Dalkon Shield could have been caused by something else, such as
another manufacturer's IUD, sexually transmissible diseases, and cancer.
The purpose of Option 2 was to provide payment to claimants who had
good medical proof of Dalkon Shield use and good medical proof of
Dalkon Shield associated injury, but whose medical records revealed seri-
ous alternative causation problems.
Option 3-The "Complete Form/Early Evaluation Offer"
The purpose of Option 3 was to provide settlement offers based on the
pre-petition historical settlement amounts for claimants with serious and
provable Dalkon Shield injuries. The CRF provided that claimants who
rejected Option 3 offers could attend a settlement conference. Finally, if
settlements could not be reached within certain time-frames, claimants
could elect binding arbitration or trial.
Option 4-Deferral
Option 4 permitted claimants to defer choosing among Options 1, 2, or
3 until after the claimant had assessed the full extent of her or his
injuries.
Late Claims
The Plan also provided for the Trustees to process claims filed after the
April 1986 Bar Date to determine whether they should be granted timely
status. Late claimants who were not accorded timely status are entitled
to compensation if there is money available after paying all timely
claimants.
Pro Rata Distribution
Finally, the Plan provides that money left over after paying all claim-
ants and the administrative expenses shall be paid to previously compen-
sated claimants on a pro rata basis.
III. THE TRUSTEES' IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CRF
Although the CRF provided this framework and some general guide-
lines, the Plan accorded the Trustees discretion to make the policy deci-
sions needed to implement the Plan.
A. Pre-Consummation Operations of the Trust
The Plan provided for the appointment of five Trustees to administer
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the Trust." The selection of the Trustees was the subject of intense ne-
gotiation. In March 1988, several months prior to entry of the Confirma-
tion Order, Judge Merhige informed the original five Trustees61 that they
had been selected, and on April 11, 1988, the court entered an order
appointing them.62
Shortly thereafter, the court met with the Trustees "to impress upon
them the tremendous responsibility of handling such a large number of
claims and such an enormous trust fund," and to urge them "'to hit the
ground running.',6 Specifically, the court wanted the Trustees to im-
plement Option 1 and pay liquidated claims as soon as practicable be-
cause interest was continuing to accrue on these claims.6
Although the pendency of the appeals of the Confirmation Order se-
verely limited the powers of the Trust to resolve claims, the Trust was
funded with a non-reversionary payment of $100 million (the "Start-up
Payment") to lease office space, hire employees, purchase furniture and
office equipment and begin paying Option 1 and Dalkon Shield Liqui-
dated Claims.65
1. Motion to Remove Trustees
Approximately two months after entry of the Confirmation Order, a
group of five unaffiliated independent attorneys representing more than
1,800 Dalkon Shield claimants filed a motion to remove the Trustees for
failing to discharge their fiduciary duties as set forth in the Claimants
Trust Agreement. The motion was joined by attorneys representing over
1,400 other claimants. The motion alleged that the Trustees, among
other things, had negligently failed to act prudently and expeditiously in
setting up the Claims Resolution Facility, had opposed the court's efforts
to supervise their activities, and had hired counsel who had an inherent
conflict of interest. 6  After a two day hearing, the court entered an order
60. See id.
61. The five original Trustees were: Barbara Blum, the President of the Foundation
for Child Development and a former Commissioner of the New York State Department
of Social Services; Kenneth Feinberg, a partner at Kaye, Sholer, Fierman, Hays & Han-
dler and Special Master in the Agent Orange Product Liability case; Gene Locks, a part-
ner at Greitzer and Locks, a Philadelphia law firm, who handled plaintiffs' asbestos
claims and served as a member of various creditors committees in the asbestos litigations;
Stephen Saltzburg, at the time a Law Professor at the University of Virginia; and Ann
Samani, a Dalkon Shield claimant who served on the Dalkon Shield Claimants' Commit-
tee in the Robins Bankruptcy, and was Estate Administrator, United States Bankruptcy
Court Clerk's Office in Kentucky. See Trustee Biographies, In re A.H. Robins Co. (No.
85-01307-R), in Sixth Amended and Restated Disclosure Statement Pursuant to Section
1125 of the Bankruptcy Code (Mar. 28, 1988).




65. See Robins II, supra note 48, 880 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1989).
66. See Robins IV, supra note 62, 880 F.2d 779, 781 (4th Cir. 1989).
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In the fall of 1988, the Trustees adopted a simple procedure for elect-
ing Option 1. A claimant only needed to file a form affidavit acknowl-
edging that she had used the Dalkon Shield and suffered an injury. The
Trustees offered Dalkon Shield users $725 each, and offered non-users
such as husbands $300. By the Consummation Date in December 1989,
the Trust had paid nearly 85,000 Option 1 claims, totalling almost
$60,000,000. Those who elect Option 1 sign a release in return for the
payment.
67. See id. at 782. According to Richard Sobol, the selection of the Trustees was a
source of great contention between Murray Drabkin, the lead attorney for the Claimants
Committee, and the district court judge. See Sobol, supra note 29, at 210-13. Three of
the original Trustees, Ann Samani, Gene Locks, and Barbara Blum (the three who were
removed), were nominated by Mr. Drabkin. See id. at 213.
The district court appointed me to fill one of the vacant Trustee positions. Two of the
three removed Trustees, Barbara Blum and Ann Samani, filed a notice of appeal. In
December 1989, the Fourth Circuit entered an order staying their removal. See Robins
III, supra note 48, 880 F.2d 769, 775 (4th Cir. 1989). Thus, pending the Fourth Circuit's
decision on the removal, which was handed down in June 1989, the five Trustees were:
the two remaining original Trustees, Kenneth Feinberg and Stephen Salzburg; the two
appealing removed trustees, Ann Samani and Barbara Blum; and myself. Gene Locks,
who was also removed, did not seek to stay the removal order.
At the time I was appointed to serve on the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, I was
serving as a Trustee of the Dalkon Shield Other Claimants Trust. The Other Claimants
Trust was funded with $50,000,000 to handle claims for contribution or indemnification
by third parties, such as doctors and hospitals, against Robins. I was appointed to the
Other Claimants Trust without objection from the Claimants Committee, after a member
of Mr. Drabkin's law firm interviewed me. Despite the circumstances of my appoint-
ment, and despite my background and experience, Mr. Sobol questions my independent
judgment and integrity. He speculates without any basis that the reason I was appointed
to the Claimants Trust and "handsomely compensated" was because I was "prepared to
carry out [Judge Merhige's] wishes." Sobol, supra note 29, at 339.
In any event, the Trustees' compensation is a matter of public record. See CTR, supra
note 4, § 3.06. Moreover, when the Trustees decided to invoke the "holdback," they
decided to "hold back" half of their salaries, and to "hold back" most meeting fees.
Thus, the Trustees will not receive their total compensation authorized by the Plan until
the Trust begins to pay on the "holdback."
68. The court noted that in the six months between the time they were appointed and
removed, the Trustees had received $17,500 each in salary, a total of more than $I 11,000
in meeting fees, and over $36,000 in expenses, but had not yet implemented Option I or
paid all the liquidated claims. See Robins IV, supra note 62, 880 F.2d 779, 784-85 (4th
Cir. 1989).
In its affirmance, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court that the original
Trustees had spent more time arguing about the extent of the district court's power to
control the Trust than they spent setting up the administration of the Plan. See id. at
785-86. In a related opinion handed down the same day, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court's broad power to supervise the Trustees in matters such as appointment and
fees of professionals. See Robins III, supra note 48, 880 F.2d 769, 776 (4th Cir. 1989).
The court noted that the district court did not have the power to interfere with the "day
to day" operations of the CRF. See id. at 776.
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In the spring of 1989, the Trustees' experts performed a study of those
who accepted Option 1 to determine whether claimants were making a
rational choice. The study indicated that only three percent of claimants
choosing Option 1 should have considered choosing Options 2 or 3.
Moreover, on closer analysis of many of these claims, it appeared that
even in those cases there may have been a valid reason why the claimant
did not hold out for more.
Use of the form affidavit may well have led to payments of $725 each
to people who did not actually use the Dalkon Shield or suffer injury
from it. The Trust, however, was not criticized for this, possibly because
most observers would agree that this was a cost-effective way of clearing
such claims. In addition, Option 1 provided a speedy mechanism for
paying those with de minimis injuries.69
3. Preparation for Consummation
During the fall of 1988, the Trustees faced the difficult task of prepar-
ing for consummation without knowing whether the Plan ultimately
would survive all appeals. Despite this uncertainty, in December 1988,
the Trustees hired experts to assist in developing the claims resolution
process under Options 2 and 3.
The Trustees retained Professor Charles Goetz, an economist and Law
Professor at the University of Virginia, to help select the expert team and
computer systems. In December 1988, the Trustees retained an expert
team that they believed provided balance and credibility.
The Trustees chose Timothy Wyant, Ph.D., a bio-statistician from the
Claimants Committee expert team, and Martha K. Wivell, a lawyer from
Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, one of the most successful firms han-
dling pre-bankruptcy plaintiffs' Dalkon Shield claims. Mr. Wyant and
Ms. Wivell's primary responsibilities were to prepare payment schedules
and rules and to forecast whether the Trust's funds were sufficient to pay
all claimants. By retaining members of the Claimants Committee estima-
tion team, the Trustees sought to ensure that payment schedules and
rules would be as favorable to claimants' interests as possible.
The Trustees also retained a former consultant to A. H. Robins, B.
Thomas Florence, Ph.D., of Resource Planning Corporation, to develop
procedures and claims forms. Rebecca Klemm of Klemm Analysis was
69. The only other claims the Trust was permitted to pay out of the Start-up Payment
prior to the Consummation Date were Dalkon Shield Liquidated Claims. These claims
are defined in the Plan as Dalkon Shield Claims that were either (a) "reduced to judg-
ment before the commencement of the [Chapter 11] Case, whether or not such judgment
[had] become final" or (b) "settled before the commencement of the Case pursuant to a
valid and binding settlement agreement but remaining unpaid as of the commencement of
the Case." See Plan, supra note 1, § 1.37.
By the Consummation Date, December 1989, the Trust had paid 38 Dalkon Shield
Liquidated Claims totalling more than $1.7 million. Since that date, the Trust has identi-
fied and paid an additional six Dalkon Shield Liquidated Claims totalling more than
$83,000.
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hired to provide analytical, statistical and logistical support. This expert
team"0 worked with Michael M. Sheppard, the Executive Director, and
the Trustees in developing the numerous policies and procedures re-
quired to implement the Plan.
The expert group began by compiling all the data relating to the valua-
tion of Dalkon Shield claims. Beginning in March 1989, a subgroup of
Trustees71 met weekly with the experts to discuss various policy issues
concerning the choices the Trust's valuation system would make. For
example, the question arose whether the Options 2 and 3 payment sys-
tems should discount in cases where legal defenses such as the statute of
limitations were applicable. The Trustees rejected such a discount be-
cause of the uncertain application of such rules and because they wanted
to provide an incentive to settle. The Trustees also rejected building into
the compensation model differences based on jurisdiction, or what lawyer
was representing the claimant, or whether the claimant was represented.
By June 1989, after the Fourth Circuit affirmed the Confirmation Or-
der, the Trustees had adopted general approaches to structuring the com-
pensation systems, staffing issues, and formulating other policies and
procedures.
By August 1989, the Trustees72 identified 155 critical tasks that needed
to be accomplished to begin the process of resolving claims under Op-
tions 2 and 3. During the fall of 1989, the Trustees adopted most of the
important policies, such as the "best and final offer," "no negotiation"
approach7 3 and the "holdback" policy.74
Although the framework for this process was in place by the fall of
1989, the final steps could not be taken until the Supreme Court an-
nounced that it would not consider any further challenges to the Plan.
Specifically, the Trustees believed it was imprudent to fully staff the CRF
because of uncertainty as to whether the Plan would survive the chal-
lenge in the Supreme Court. Moreover, it was difficult to recruit quali-
fied employees at a time when the Trust could not assure candidates that
70. Another candidate was Mark Peterson of Rand Corporation who worked with
the court in connection with the estimation hearing and who subsequently was retained
by one of the major plaintiffs' lawyers. Mr. Peterson later wrote one of the articles in the
Duke Symposium which criticized the Trust. See Mark A. Peterson, Giving Away
Money: Comparative Comments on Claims Resolution Facilities, 53 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 113, 135 (1990). For further discussion of this article, see infra note 133.
71. The Trustees selected Ann Samani, one of the Trustees ultimately removed, and
this author to serve on this subcommittee.
72. At the time, the Trustees were Steven A. Saltzburg (who resigned in September
1989) and Kenneth R. Feinberg (who resigned in the spring of 1990), the remaining two
original Trustees; the author of this Essay; Marietta Robinson, a lawyer who represents
plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions; and John Dowd, a prominent Washington, D.C.
lawyer (who resigned in the spring of 1990), appointed in June 1989. The current Trust-
ees are the author;, Ms. Robinson; Robert Smith; a lawyer and former United States se-
nior senatorial official; Henry Spalding, an investment advisor;, and Ellen Bishop, a
Dalkon Shield user who suffered Dalkon Shield injuries.
73. See infra Part III.E.3.
74. See infra Part III.E.4.
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their jobs would not terminate in a matter of months. Immediately after
the Supreme Court denied certiorari in early November 1989, 71 however,
the Trust finalized the claim election packets to be mailed to all claim-
ants and the claim evaluation rules, and hired and began to train the first
wave of claims reviewers.
The goal was to have the claim election packets ready for mailing by
the middle of March 1990, within three months of the projected date of
consummation.76 The Trustees, the expert team, Michael Sheppard and
his staff (including in-house counsel Linda Thomason and Ann Peters,
the Trust's claims manager, who supervised the Dalkon Shield Records
Center Annex to the bankruptcy court) worked zealously during the fall
and winter of 1989-1990 to meet this goal.
Early in the process, the Trustees realized that their philosophy, which
de-emphasized the adversarial system, and the policies they adopted re-
quired a staff fully trained in the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust ap-
proach. Accordingly, no claims adjusters who may have held pre-
conceived notions about how to settle cases were hired. Instead, the
Trustees employed well-educated people and taught them the Trust sys-
tem from scratch.
The expert team, led by Ms. Wivell, trained the first wave of claims
evaluators. The claims evaluators review the Option 2 and Option 3 elec-
tion forms and medical records submitted by the claimants. They apply
the claims evaluation rules the Trust developed to the records submitted
to determine the appropriate offer. To control costs, once Trust person-
nel were fully trained in the Trust's claim evaluation system, they as-
sumed responsibility for training succeeding waves of claim evaluators.
The Trust is currently staffed by about 300 employees.
B. Post-Consummation Operations of the Trust
The Trust met its goal of mailing out claim election packets in mid-
March 1990. These packets included the forms necessary to elect either
Options 1, 2, 3, or 4, or to withdraw claims. The packets also included
detailed instructions and information about the different payment Op-
tions, and how to prepare the forms and collect the necessary medical
75. See Robins 1, supra note 46, 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Menard-Sanford v. A.H. Robins Co., 493 U.S. 959 (1989).
76. Richard Sobol criticized the Trust for not being prepared to send out the claim
election packets immediately upon the denial of certiorari. See Sobol, supra note 29, at
311-12. The Trustees could not predict the outcome of the petition, however, and time
was running out on American Home Products' agreement to purchase Robins. If the
deal between American Home Products and A.H. Robins was not consummated by De-
cember 1989, American Home Products could have withdrawn its offer, and there would
have been no settlement fund. In any event, a three month delay is hardly noteworthy.
With respect to the Special Program, established to provide medical assistance to women
with fertility problems who wanted to become pregnant, the Trust, especially Stephen
Saltzburg, made every effort to obtain permission to use a portion of the start-up payment
for such purposes. Unfortunately, all efforts were unavailing. The Special Program was
launched immediately after consummation, and many pregnancies have resulted.
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records. The packets also included the schedule of payments for Option
2, which ranged from $850 to $5,500 depending on the severity of the
injury. Because of the complexity of the medical issues, especially in de-
termining whether the Dalkon Shield caused the claimants injury, it was
impossible to prepare an Option 3 schedule of payments. Each claim-
ant's offer depends on her specific proof.
On March 15, 1990, the Trust mailed packets containing claim elec-
tion forms for all four settlement options, as well as the withdrawal op-
tion, to 85,000 claimants who had identified themselves as Dalkon Shield
users and who had not elected Option 1. The Trust sent the remaining
30,000 claimants a letter asking them to identify the nature of their
claims.77 The Trust staff was ready to begin evaluating Option 2 and 3
claims immediately. By the summer of 1990, the Trust was able to pro-
cess Option 2 claims as they came through the door. While the Option 3
claims process was slow at first, by the summer of 1991, the Trust
achieved a rate of 200 claims per week or 10,000 offers per year on Op-
tion 3 claims. By the summer of 1992, the Trust was extending over 240
offers per week, or nearly 13,000 offers per year.
The Trustees believe that a faster rate of claims evaluation for Option
3 offers would compromise the Trust's quality control, which has re-
sulted in consistency of offers and, thus, fairness to claimants."' Because
the Option 3 offer is the "best and final" offer,7 9 it is imperative that the
Trust make every effort to insure the accuracy of its offers.
As of October 1992, there were fewer than 21,000 completed Option 3
files to be reviewed. Thus, offers should be made to those claimants
before the summer of 1994. There are another 6,000 incomplete files.
Some of these claimants are likely to select Options 1 or 2. The Trust
estimates that all offers should be made by the end of 1994 or early 1995.
C. Primary Motivating Principles
Before discussing specific Trust policies and procedures, it is helpful to
look at the Trustees' overall philosophy. Every policy decision the Trust-
ees make has been driven by the following principles:
1. TREAT ALL CLAIMANTS FAIRLY AND EQUALLY, ALWAYS FO-
77. Once these remaining claimants responded, the Trust sent them the appropriate
claim packet. By July 1, 1990, the Trust had mailed some form of the claim packet to all
active claimants.
78. The claims process is designed to insure that claimants with the same injury and
the same evidence receive the same offer.
79. See infra Part III.E.3. The Option 2 offer is also "best and final" in that a claim-
ant who elects Option 2 knows what amount she will receive by consulting the schedule
of Option 2 payments. For example, if she claims, and her medical records show, that
she has had sterilizing surgery due to PID, she will receive $5,500 and sign a release. If
she does not receive the amount she expects because, for example, her records prove a
lesser injury, she can reject her Option 2 offer and elect to be reviewed under Option 3.
She may accept the Option 3 offer or proceed to ADR or a settlement conference, as all
other Option 3 claimants are entitled to do.
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CUSING ON THE BEST INTERESTS OF CLAIMANTS COLLECTIVELY IN-
STEAD OF ON THE INTERESTS OF A PARTICULAR CLAIMANT OR
GROUP OF CLAIMANTS.
This principle sets the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust apart from the
traditional tort system.8" In essence, the Trust adopted a fiduciary stance
vis-A-vis the claimants through the claims resolution process, and an ad-
versarial stance if the claimant elected the traditional tort process. One
of the questions that only time can answer completely is whether the
Trust's claims resolution process avoided problems with the adversarial
model, thus achieving a higher level of claimant satisfaction with the pro-
cess at a lower transactional cost.
The Trustees recognize that an individual may not do as well under
the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust system as she might in the traditional
tort system. For example, in a typical products liability case, the plaintiff
with the best tort lawyer is likely to extract a better settlement offer from
the defendant simply because of her lawyer's skill. The Trust, however,
rejected that model, adopting rules which empowered the less powerful
to insure that every claimant's case is evaluated solely on the basis of her
evidence, regardless of who her lawyer is or what jurisdiction she is from,
or what type of witness she might make.
Fairness requires the Trust to treat all claimants in the same manner.
Of course, extraordinary circumstances occasionally arise which require
an exception to this principle. For example, if a claimant is in a terminal
medical condition, the Trust will expedite the disposition of her claim.
This principle of equal treatment has led to considerable criticism.
Some critics, generally plaintiffs' lawyers as opposed to unrepresented
claimants, suggest that the Trust's failure to consider individual requests
is unfair. The Trust, however, does consider all requests for individual-
ized treatment; it simply will not grant special treatment to a claimant
unless there are demonstrably unique considerations that justify a depar-
ture from the equality principle.
The Trust assumes that in the real world, not all people (namely,
claimants-or their lawyers, for that matter) are equally powerful. The
adversary model results all too often in unequal justice, with more com-
pensation for the powerful. Logically, this could lead to systemic unfair-
ness in a case such as this one where there is a limited fund with which to
compensate all claimants. Every extra dollar a powerful claimant ex-
tracts from the Trust is a dollar that otherwise could have gone to a less
powerful claimant. Assuming that a represented claimant is, by defini-
tion, more powerful than an unrepresented one, failing to equalize the
power relationships would injure or be unfair to the unrepresented claim-
ants, who were approximately seventy-one percent"1 of all claimants. By
80. It may also be consistent with feminist jurisprudence models. See supra notes 16-
24 and accompanying text.
81. At the time virtually all the Trustees' major policy decisions were made, approxi-
[Vol. 61
1992] THE DALKON SHIELD CLAIMANTS TRUST 639
refusing to play the adversary game, the Trust is attempting to make it
possible for the claimants to compete against each other solely on the
strengths of their claims, rather than on the strength of their legal
representation.
The Trustees made a number of decisions to facilitate this policy. For
example, the Trust's claims forms and informational materials were
designed to insure that all claimants would be able to handle their claims
without lawyers. The claims forms were revised many times to ensure
that unrepresented claimants could understand the forms and the infor-
mation requested. In fact, the Trust tested its claims forms and instruc-
tions on unrepresented claimants from a broad range of socio-economic
levels. As a result of this testing, the claims forms were revised many
times.
In addition, the Trust has a program for helping claimants prepare
their claims. Once a claimant submits her claims materials, a reviewer
will examine her claims forms and documents to insure that they are
complete. If there are document gaps, the reviewer affords the claimant
an opportunity to submit the missing documents, or to explain why they
are unavailable. If the claimant cannot obtain her medical records be-
cause the hospital or her doctor will not release them, another Trust unit
will help her obtain them.
2. PRESERVE THE FUNDS AVAILABLE TO CLAIMANTS wrrH
VALID CLAIMS BY KEEPING ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES AT A
MINIMUM.
The Trustees want to treat the last claimant to whom an offer is made
in the same manner as they treated the first claimant. To achieve this
end, the Trustees have made a number of controversial decisions, such as
the "best and final offer" approach, the "no negotiation" policy, and the
"holdback," each of which will be discussed below.
3. PREFER SETTLEMENT AND PROMPT PAYMENT OF CLAIMS
OVER ARBITRATION AND LITIGATION.
The same controversial policies also are designed to provide incentives
to claimants to settle within the claims resolution process rather than to
litigate. The theory behind the "best and final offer" approach, for exam-
ple, is to present the claimant with as high an offer as possible, given the
Trust's limited fund and the claimant's proof. If she knows that the
Trust will not negotiate, or settle on the courthouse steps because those
increments have already been included in her offer, she is not as likely to
test the offer, thereby subjecting herself to delay in payment, or, possibly,
an adverse verdict. Similarly, by paying a claimant her full Option 3
offer if she accepts, the Trust is fulfilling the goals of preferring settle-
ment and prompt payment.
mately 127,000 claimants of the approximately 179,000 claimants (71%) who qualified
for review were unrepresented.
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D. Communication
To ensure that all active claimants receive accurate and complete in-
formation, the Trust publishes a newsletter for claimants. As of Novem-
ber 1992, the Trust had distributed to claimants twelve editions of the
newsletter, entitled the "Claims Resolution Report." Because so many
claimants were unrepresented by lawyers, the newsletter is written in
"plain English" so that it can be easily understood, even by those claim-
ants with poor reading skills. The Claims Resolution Report contains,
among other things, information about the claims process, including dis-
cussions of the different payment options, how the process works, and
timing considerations.
The Trust also has published several editions of a newsletter for law-
yers, the "Attorney Update." It contains some of the same information
as the claimant newsletter but also addresses questions and concerns
unique to lawyers.
By reducing important Trust policies to writing and publishing them
in newsletters sent to all claimants or their attorneys of record, the Trust
guarantees that the same, consistent information is disseminated to the
claimants and the legal community. This promotes equal treatment and
allays perceptions that certain lawyers receive preference. It also pre-
vents lawyers or others from claiming that they have special inside
knowledge.
Moreover, pursuant to the Plan, the Trust employs a number of indi-
viduals who serve as "Personal Contacts" for claimants. All active
claimants are provided with the name and direct-dial telephone number
of their Personal Contact, who is trained to answer questions regarding
the claim forms and the claims resolution process. Personal Contacts
have handled thousands of telephone calls and have responded to
thousands of letters. They do not give advice on which payment Option
to elect, but will refer claimants to Trust materials, such as the Claims
Resolution Process Report, which provides the information claimants
should need in making a decision.
In a further effort to communicate with and explain the claims evalua-
tion process to claimants, the Trust held informational meetings for un-
represented claimants in Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Denver, Los
Angeles, New York City, and Philadelphia. The Dalkon Shield Informa-
tion Network ("DSIN"), a non-profit claimant support group,82 co-spon-
sored these meetings. The format included comments by a DSIN
representative, a slide show of the Trust's facilities, an explanation by the
Trust's Manager of Claimant Relations of the requirements for the vari-
ous options for settling claims, and a question and answer session.
Thousands of unrepresented claimants attended these meetings.
In addition, the Trustees met with a group of unrepresented claimants
from all over the country and from Canada in a further effort to listen
82. See supra note 6 for a further discussion of the DSIN.
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and learn, to answer questions, and to reassure the claimants that no
special rules would be developed or used to favor lawyers or represented
claimants. After this meeting, the Trustees made a number of policy de-
cisions to respond to the concerns raised. For example, the Trustees de-
cided to absorb the cost of translating foreign documents if the claimant
was unable to do so herself.
The Trustees also had two lengthy sessions with members of the plain-
tiffs' bar who handled Dalkon Shield cases. One meeting was held in
Boston in July 1989. At that point, the Trustees' general approach was
tentatively presented, but few final decisions had been made. The pri-
mary purpose of the meeting was to listen to the plaintiffs' bar. The next
meeting was in Orlando in January 1990. At that meeting, the Trustees
set out in detail their major policy decisions, such as the "best and final"
offer, "no negotiation" policy, and implementation of the "holdback."8 3
E. The Claims Review Process
1. Valuation
To facilitate the fair and equal treatment of all claims, the Trust
designed the claims review process to evaluate each and every Option 3
claim under the same highly structured, rules-based process. For in-
stance, in making Option 3 offers, the Trust does not consider a claim-
ant's geographic location or legal representation. Similarly, those claims
involved in lawsuits pending before A.H. Robins filed for reorganization
in August 1985 (the "Frozen Claims") are not offered more than non-
Frozen claims.
The Plan provides that the Trust's settlement values in Option 3
should be consistent with historical, pre-petition settlement values." To
assist the Trustees in determining the rules that would be applied to
make Option 3 offers, the Trust's experts selected about 30 attorneys who
were active in pre-petition Dalkon Shield cases or who represented large
numbers of claimants. These attorneys were asked to review a number of
redacted case files from resolved Dalkon Shield cases that were typical of
Dalkon Shield claims or that presented difficult evaluation issues. The
attorneys were asked to value the worth of each of the sample claims in
1985 and to value each sample claim, given a limited fund from which all
had to be settled. The attorneys submitted their evaluations to the Trust.
The Trust's experts then followed up by interviewing the lawyers who
83. Critics charge that the Trust has been unresponsive and inflexible. See Sobol,
supra note 29, at 315-18. This criticism is hard to fathom given the lengths to which the
Trustees reviewed (and often implemented) suggestions submitted by individual lawyers
and claimants, answered questions, and the extent to which the Trustees adjusted the
claims process to implement such suggestions. See infra Part IV.
84. See CRF, supra note 15, § E.2. To date, amounts offered under Option 3 have
ranged from $125 (to claimants whose claims fail due to a lack of probative evidence of
Dalkon Shield use or injury) to over $1 million. See infra note 135 for a summary of the
Trust's claims experience to date.
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participated to clarify their responses and to explore the areas of agree-
ment and the few areas where there was disagreement. The Attorney
Evaluation Project helped the experts refine the claims evaluation rules
and confirmed that the Trust's system would result in a proper evalua-
tion of claims.
2. Priority in Processing: The Queue
The CRF requires the Trust to process claims in chronological order
based on the date the Trust receives all documentation necessary to pro-
cess the claim.8 5 Two groups of Option 3 claims, however, are entitled to
priority treatment. The first group of claims (the "Priority Claims") in-
cludes those of claimants who were involved in the Frozen Claims. The
second group includes those of claimants chosen to participate in the
data collection part of the estimation process who returned a completed
fifty page questionnaire in connection with the study conducted by court-
appointed experts for the purpose of estimating Dalkon Shield claims.8 6
The Trustees also have the authority to "consider and pay claims in
any order for reasons of hardship or necessity or major efficiencies in
claim handling." 7 The Trustees, however, have granted fewer than 100
requests for expedited treatment under Option 3. All of these claimants
had a terminal or life-threatening health problem. 8
Apart from the exceptions for hardship cases, the Trust does not devi-
ate from reviewing claims in the order in which they are received. To
administer this policy, the Trust uses a queue system. Each Option 3
claim is assigned a queue number on the date it is received by the Trust.
Priority Claims are specially coded to identify them for priority process-
ing. The Trust processed all completed Priority Claims it received before
it began processing other Option 3 claims in the fall of 1991.
3. Best and Final Offer/No Negotiation
The Trustees have made a number of policy decisions to accomplish
their goal of promoting settlement over litigation and arbitration. One
such policy decision is to make Option 3 offers that are the highest
amount the Trust believes it can pay a claimant based on the medical
evidence submitted, historical settlement values and the existence of the
limited fund. Accordingly, the offers will necessarily be "best and final"
offers instead of initial, "low-ball" offers.
Because the Trust's offers will already be fair and as high as the evi-
dence will support, the Trust will not negotiate at the settlement confer-
85. See CRF, supra note 15, § G.4.
86. See id. § G.1.
87. Id.
88. The unrepresented claimants who visited the Trustees in January 1990 were sup-
portive of this policy. They seemed to agree that the Trust could not grant individuals
hardship status based solely on financial considerations due to the difficulty of determin-
ing limiting principles.
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ences established by the Plan. Rather, these conferences are used to
answer questions and to explain the strengths and weaknesses of the
claims. Unless newly discovered evidence is provided or an error has
been made, the offer will not be increased or decreased.
If a claimant rejects the Trust's Option 3 offer and elects to proceed to
trial or arbitration, the Trust will not offer more money to settle "on the
courthouse steps." The Trustees are determined to avoid creeping settle-
ments which could cause serious financial deficiencies to the Trust and
which would work to the detriment of claimants who have not yet been
paid. Changing this policy also would be fundamentally unfair to those
claimants who took the Trust at its word and accepted what they be-
lieved was the highest amount the Trust would pay.
4. Holdback
The Plan permits the Trustees to withhold some portion of the
amounts awarded and to pay the balance when satisfied that sufficient
funds are available to pay all valid claims.8 9 If a claimant obtains a judg-
ment after binding arbitration or trial, the Trustees will assert the hold-
back provision.
To facilitate settlement, if a claimant accepts the Trust's offer at Op-
tion 2 or 3, she will receive the full amount offered. If, however, a claim-
ant is offered $X at Option 3, rejects that offer, and then goes to trial and
obtains a judgment for $10X, the claimant will only be paid $X or
$10,000, whichever is greater. The Trustees will pay the remainder only
when they are satisfied that they have fulfilled their obligation under the
Plan to "ensure equality in distribution among claimants and the contin-
ued availability of funds to pay all valid non-subordinated claims."'
Although the Trustees hope that all judgments eventually will be paid in
full, holdback amounts will not be paid until the Trustees are confident
that sufficient funds remain to pay all valid, non-subordinated claims.
The holdback provision is consistent with the Trustee's goal to pro-
mote settlement over litigation and arbitration. By announcing that any
amounts awarded above the Trust's offer will be held back, the Trust
creates a disincentive for claimants to "roll the dice" in litigation rather
than accepting a settlement offer from the Trust. This approach also
should minimize the Trust's defense costs, which ultimately are borne by
other claimants.
5. In-Depth Review/Settlement Conferences
The in-depth review and settlement conference stage is the final step of
the claims resolution process for Option 3 claimants who have rejected
the Trust's settlement offers.9" No claimant can proceed either to bind-
89. See CRF, supra note 15, § G.3.
90. Id
91. See id § E.4.
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ing arbitration or litigation until this final phase of the claims process is
completed.92
While the initial review of an Option 3 claim is construed liberally in
favor of the claimant, the in-depth review is conducted exactly as its
name implies-the Trust takes a more studied look at the claimant's evi-
dence using the same evaluation rules utilized in the initial review. Fol-
lowing this in-depth review, settlement conferences are scheduled in
order for the claimant to meet with Trust representatives to discuss the
strengths and weaknesses of her claim and to determine whether any
mistakes have been made in the evaluation process. Unless a mistake in
the evaluation of the claim is discovered, or the claimant can present
newly discovered evidence, the Trust will not increase its Option 3
offer. 9
3
If the new information presented at the settlement conference could
have been discovered before the claim was originally reviewed by the
Trust, it cannot be considered "newly discovered." Nevertheless, should
the claimant desire the Trust to re-evaluate her claim in light of this new
information, the Trust will assign the claim a new queue number and the
claim will be reviewed again when its new number comes up in the
queue.
Participation in the settlement conference is voluntary.94 Whether or
not a claimant chooses to attend, however, the conference must be sched-
uled because the conference date is critical to the determination of when
the claimant is eligible to commence or recommence litigation or
arbitration. 95
The Trustees consider their "best and final offer" approach and the
holdback provision strong incentives for claimants to settle. These poli-
92. See id. § E.5.
93. Adapting case law that interprets Rule 60(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure to Trust procedures, "newly discovered evidence" is defined as evidence that was
in existence at the time of the initial claim review, of which the claimant was excusably
ignorant. The claimant must, therefore, demonstrate that she used due diligence in her
attempts to obtain this evidence prior to the initial review of her claim. This new evi-
dence must be relevant and not merely cumulative or repetitive of evidence previously
submitted. Moreover, to be considered "newly discovered," such evidence must be likely
to lead to a different result when the claim is reviewed again.
94. See CRF, supra note 15, § E.4.
95. Specifically, the Trust mails the claimant a packet of information within sixty
days of the conference. The packet contains a final offer letter, the rules governing arbi-
tration, a letter explaining procedures for pursuing a claim and a copy of Amended Ad-
ministrative Order Number 1, which governs all arbitration and litigation proceedings.
See infra Part III.G. Thereafter, the Trust's final offer will remain on the table for 90
days following the settlement conference. On the ninetieth day, if the claimant has not
accepted the offer, it is formally and forever withdrawn. The claimant is then asked to
elect either arbitration or trial, and the Trust applies to the district court for an order
certifying that the claimant has completed the claims resolution process and may now
proceed to arbitration or trial. Only claimants who elect the alternative dispute resolu-
tion process may bypass the settlement conference. See infra Part III.F.
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cies, however, also ensure that once claimants reject the Trust's offers,
litigation or arbitration will inevitably follow.
a. Litigation
Because the Trustees are determined to keep litigation and defense
costs to a minimum to preserve the assets in the fund for compensatory
purposes, they did not hire a large law firm to serve as a "national coor-
dinating counsel." Rather, the Trustees believe that the cost of litigation
can be controlled most cost-effectively by centralizing its coordination
out of the Trust's offices in Richmond. Consequently, the Trust employs
several trial teams and counsel in all states, but their role will be to try
cases, not to negotiate settlements.96
b. Arbitration
As previously stated, claimants who reject the Trust's Option 3 offer
can elect either litigation or binding arbitration.9" So far, most of these
claimants have chosen litigation, which is not surprising because a major-
ity of these claims were the Frozen Claims that were subject to the auto-
matic stay under section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. By October
1992, approximately twenty-six percent of those claimants who have
elected to go beyond the claims resolution process have elected some
form of arbitration.
To accommodate unrepresented claimants who reject the Option 3 of-
fer, the Trustees have developed different arbitration options which may
be attractive to these claimants, as well as to some represented claimants.
The Trust has regular arbitration procedures and has adapted a discov-
ery rule that the Trustees believe is more generous than that of most
states. The Trust's rules also provide that the law of Virginia applies.
The Trustees adopted these uniform rules to maintain the equality of
treatment principle and to ensure efficient administration.
Furthermore, the Trustees developed "Fast-Track" arbitration. Here,
if a claimant agrees to cap her recovery at $10,000, the Trust will waive
statute of limitations defenses, use an expedited procedure, and waive
virtually all formal discovery and evidentiary requirements. Moreover, if
the claimant is unrepresented, the Trust will be represented by a non-
96. The Trust started planning for litigation in the fall of 1990 by holding several
meetings with distinguished counsel. The Trustees used a similar approach in developing
their litigation policies and procedures as they did in putting together the Options 2 and 3
payment systems. Over 100 critical tasks were identified, ranging from choosing outside
counsel to developing brief banks and witness lists. The Trustees also developed policies
on many litigation strategy issues. For example, one important issue was whether the
Trust could concede product defect in order to narrow the issue for trial to alternative
causation. Another important issue was how to handle questions pertaining to a claim-
ant's sexual history or exposure to sexually transmissable diseases. The Trustees have
prohibited their lawyers from inquiring into a claimant's sexual history unless there is a
pre-existing foundation for seeking to establish a relevant alternative causation defense.
97. See CRF, supra note 15, § E.4.
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lawyer employee of the Trust. This option may prove to be most attrac-
tive to unrepresented claimants, particularly those who have received low
offers. These claimants may truly believe that their injuries were caused
by the Dalkon Shield, but cannot prove it. This option gives them an
opportunity to "tell their story," which the Trustees feel is an important
ingredient of claimant satisfaction with the dispute resolution process.
The CRF provides for arbitration before a neutral third party. The
Trustees selected Private Adjudication Center, Inc., an affiliate of the
Duke University School of Law in Durham, North Carolina, as the Neu-
tral Third Party ("NTP") required by the CRF.98 The NTP is responsi-
ble for selecting a panel of arbitrators, sending a list of proposed
arbitrators to the parties, selecting an arbitrator after the parties have
ranked the proposed arbitrators, scheduling pre-hearing conferences and
selecting independent medical experts.99
F. ADR Option
After about one year's experience in making Option 3 offers, the Trust-
ees realized that the vast majority of claimants rejecting their Option 3
offers had received offers under $6,000. The Trustees believed that it
would be appropriate to develop an alternative dispute resolution process
("ADR") for these claimants, rather than to require them to go through
the in-depth review and settlement conference process before proceeding
to arbitration or trial. While the latter process is lengthy and costly, both
for the claimant and the Trust, the ADR process is quick, simple and
exacts very low transaction costs.
The ADR option and rules are similar to the Fast-Track arbitration
option outlined above. A claimant who agrees to cap her recovery at
$10,000 need not wait for an in-depth review and a settlement confer-
ence, but rather can immediately elect the expedited ADR process before
an impartial referee. When unrepresented claimants elect ADR, the
Trust is represented by a non-lawyer.
G. Amended Administrative Order Number 1
The Trustees recognized that not every claimant will accept the
Trust's Option 3 offer. To avoid inconsistent and unfair results in the
inevitable trials and arbitration proceedings to come, the Trustees de-
vised an administrative order to govern various aspects of arbitration and
litigation and to establish rules, in keeping with the Plan and CRF, that
98. See id. § E.5.a.
99. The panel of arbitrators is composed primarily of retired trial judges and lawyers
with at least 10 years of significant trial experience. No one who personally used the
Dalkon Shield, or who has any immediate family member who used the Dalkon Shield,
may be an arbitrator. Likewise, no person who has had any involvement in claims or
litigation arising out of the Dalkon Shield or any other intrauterine device is eligible to
serve as an arbitrator.
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may be applied consistently and uniformly throughout every arbitration
and litigation forum.
Under the Plan, and notwithstanding the Plan's confirmation and con-
summation, the District Court, sitting in bankruptcy, retains jurisdiction,
inter alia, to enter orders in aid of the Plan and the CRF.1° Accord-
ingly, on March 6, 1991, the Trust filed a motion asking the court to
enter Administrative Order Number 1.101
All Dalkon Shield claimants with timely and late claims were given
notice of the Trust's motion and an opportunity to object to the proposed
order. The court held a hearing on the Trust's motion in Richmond,
Virginia on May 21, 1991. The court entered Amended Administrative
Order Number 1 (the "Administrative Order") on July 1, 1991. t11 Cur-
rently, the order is on appeal in the Fourth Circuit.
The following is a summary of the most important provisions of the
Administrative Order.
1. Holdback
In paragraph 13 of the Administrative Order, the district court ap-
proved the necessity of the "holdback" provision to "assure the contin-
ued availability of funds to pay all valid Dalkon Shield Personal Injury
Claims" from the limited fund.103 Paragraph 13 reflects the holdback
provision adopted by the Trustees which was described above."0 ' This
aspect of the Administrative Order is under appeal.
2. Discovery
Paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of the Administrative Order implement section
E.5(c) of the CRF by setting the initial parameters of discovery for arbi-
tration and litigation. 105 These provisions streamline and centralize the
control of all discovery in arbitration and litigation with the District
Court. As a result, the Trust is protected from the costly process of re-
sponding to innumerable and often repetitious discovery requests before
judges and arbitrators not fully familiar with the Plan or with the volume
of previously produced documents.
Paragraph 4 of the Administrative Order requires the Trust to estab-
100. See Plan, supra note 1, § 8.05.
101. See Motion of the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust for an Administrative Order
Governing All Arbitration and Litigation Proceedings Commenced, Recommenced or to
be Commenced Pursuant to Section E of the Claims Resolution Facility, In re A.H. Rob-
ins Co. (No. 85-01307-R) (Mar. 6, 1991).
102. See Amended Administrative Order Number 1, Governing Dalkon Shield Arbi-
tration and Litigation, In re A.H. Robins Co. (No. 85-01307-R) (July 1, 1991) [hereinaf-
ter Administrative Order].
103. See id. at para. 13.
104. See id. at para. 13. See supra Part III.E.4. for a discussion of the holdback
provision.
105. See Administrative Order, supra note 101, at paras. 4, 5, 6.
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lish and maintain a document depository in Richmond."° The docu-
ment depository contains as many of those documents produced without
qualification by Robins in pre-petition lawsuits as the Trust, using its best
efforts, has been able to identify. Thus, every claimant is afforded equal
access to all discovery materials and the Trust is spared the burden and
expense of responding repeatedly to identical document requests.
In addition to the central document depository, the Administrative
Order requires the Trust to make available a catalog indexing materials
and documents used in pre-petition matters.1"7 Using this catalog, all
claimants can obtain listed documents by placing orders for them di-
rectly with the copying service that maintains these catalogued materials
and documents.
Finally, paragraph 6 of the Administrative Order places certain limita-
tions on the type and extent of allowable discovery in Dalkon Shield arbi-
tration and litigation.18 Claimants are prohibited from conducting
discovery against Robins, AHP, the Successor Corporation, Aetna, and
any of their present or former officers, directors, employees, attorneys,
agents, or representatives. Furthermore, all discovery against the Trust
must be in the form of interrogatories and requests for admission, and
may not reach issues of Trust administration. Discovery is permitted,
however, against persons identified by the Trust as expert witnesses to be
called in individual trials or arbitration hearings. In arbitration matters,
discovery is to be conducted as provided by the arbitration rules.
3. Commencement/Recommencement of Litigation
One of the Trustees' obligations under the Plan and its supporting doc-
uments is to enforce the Plan's injunction prohibiting claimants from fil-
ing an action against, inter alia, the Trust. 9 This section of the Plan
contemplates that a claimant cannot bring an action against the Trust
until he or she has completed all steps in the Option 3 claims resolution
process and has properly elected to proceed. As part of their duty to
enforce the Plan's injunction, the Trustees must have a uniform mecha-
nism for determining or signaling that a proper election has been made
and that the claim may go forward.
Paragraph 2 of the Administrative Order sets forth such a uniform
mechanism.110 Pursuant to that paragraph, once a claimant has com-
pleted the claims resolution process, the Trust applies to the district
court for an order certifying that the claimant is eligible to proceed to
either litigation or arbitration. This process removes from the claimant
the burden of petitioning the court for relief from the Plan's injunction
106. See id. at para. 4.
107. See id. at para. 5.
108. See id. at para. 6.
109. See Plan, supra note 1, § 8.04.
110. See Administrative Order, supra note 101, at para. 2.
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and provides a court in which a Frozen Case is pending with an official
order unequivocally stating that the case is ready to proceed.
Once a case has been certified as ready to proceed, the Administrative
Order requires that the claimant conform any existing pleadings to its
provisions.1 I I Thus, any demand for trebled, exemplary or punitive dam-
ages or attorney fees, none of which are available under the CRF, must
be removed. 1 2 Further, in Frozen Cases, the plaintiff must substitute




Under numerous provisions of the Administrative Order, the district
court retains various powers regarding litigation and arbitration. As
stated above, the Plan grants the court continuing supervisory powers in
connection with disputes arising under the Plan.' 14 Discovery disputes
in arbitration and litigation commenced pursuant to the Administrative
Order may be resolved by the district court. I I5 Paragraph 11 of the Ad-
ministrative Order empowers the court to stay any arbitration or litiga-
tion upon a showing by the Trust of undue prejudice from the
multiplicity of ongoing, pending or scheduled trials or arbitration hear-
ings.II6 Paragraph 11 also authorizes the court to stay those arbitration
hearings or trials which are shown by the Trust to be proceeding in viola-
tion of the Administrative Order, in contravention of the court's jurisdic-
tion or in violation of the Plan.' 1 7
H. Other Claims Issues
1. Late Claims
There are currently more than 60,000 Late Claims pending against the
Trust. Under the Plan, Late Claimants are entitled to subordinated
treatment.' 8 In other words, they may be paid by the Trust only after
all timely filed claims have been paid in full.
On December 15, 1989, the Consummation Date, the Trustees deter-
mined that to fulfill their fiduciary obligations to claimants with timely
filed, active claims, they could no longer accept Late Claims. In part,
this decision was motivated by the Trustees' desire to conserve assets in
1ll. See id. at para. 10.
112. See id at para. 9.
113. See id. at para. 10.
114. See Plan, supra note 1, § 8.05; see also Robins I, supra note 48, 880 F.2d 769, 776
(4th Cir. 1989) (upholding district court's supervisory power, except in the case of day-to-
day operations of the Trust); Administrative Order, supra note 101, at para. 3 (granting
the court jurisdiction over disputes as provided by the Plan).
115. See Administrative Order, supra note 101, at para. 6.
116. See id. at para. 11. To date, this power has not been invoked.
117. See id.
118. See CRF, supra note 15, § G.15.d.
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order to pay timely filed claims rather than to administer Late Claims.
The Claims Resolution Facility sets forth a detailed administrative pro-
cedure pursuant to which the Trust must review Late Claims to deter-
mine whether they are entitled to treatment equivalent to timely filed
claims.'19
2. Disallowed Claims
The Claims Resolution Facility contains no provision for reviewing
reinstatement requests by claimants whose claims the court disallowed
for failing to complete the two-step claim filing process by not returning
the court questionnaire. Indeed, the CRF prohibits the Trust from con-
sidering disallowed claims unless they are reinstated by the court.'
Disallowed claimants who have filed a "Statement of Intent" to partici-
pate in the related Breland class action, however, can receive compensa-
tion from the fund created to establish the "Global Peace," as discussed
above. 121
3. Unreleased Claims-"Independent Medical Malpractice"
The Plan and its attachments contain the "Global Peace" provisions
channeling into the Trust all personal injury claims against Robins, its
affiliates, and other persons (including physicians, for example) arising
out of the sale and use of the Dalkon Shield, and all non-personal injury
claims to the Dalkon Shield Other Claimants Trust.
The Plan is designed to ensure that Dalkon Shield claims are compen-
sated fully, fairly, and efficiently, and to minimize the expense and bur-
den of litigation relating to the Dalkon Shield.
Under the Plan, all Dalkon Shield claims against Robins, its affiliates,
and any other persons (including Aetna, AHP, the Successor Corpora-
tion, physicians and health-care providers) (the "Released Parties"),
119. See id. By attempting to cut off Late Claims, the Trustees sought to save the
Trust hundreds of thousands of dollars in administrative costs needed to process Late
Claims and to coordinate the necessary hearings and inevitable appeals that would arise
from this process. The Trustees believed that such expenditures would compromise their
fiduciary obligations to timely claimants and Late Claimants who filed claims between
May 1, 1986 and December 15, 1989.
On March 30, 1990, however, the court entered an order requiring the Trust to con-
tinue accepting Late Claims. See Order, In re A.H. Robins Co. (No. 85-01307-R) (Mar.
30, 1990). Pursuant to the court's order, the Trust sent a Late Claim Form to all persons
who contacted the Trust between December 15, 1989 and March 30, 1990 regarding the
filing of Late Claims. Upon receipt of a completed Late Claim Form, the Trust will send
the late claimant written notification of her late claim number and will instruct her to
submit medical evidence of Dalkon Shield use if she wishes the Trust to consider her
claim. This additional requirement minimizes unnecessary expenses by ensuring that the
Trust will only undertake the costly administrative review process of potential timely
treatment for those claimants with valid Dalkon Shield claims.
120. See CTR, supra note 4, § 5.02(b).
121. See supra Part III.B.2.b.
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have been released or discharged."U The Plan permanently enjoins the
commencement or continuation in any manner of any suit or proceeding
against the Released Parties and prohibits any actions that do not com-
ply with the Plan's claims resolution process.123
The only exception to the Plan's broad permanent injunction and re-
lease is for claims based solely on "independent medical malpractice,"
but only if such claims cannot be asserted against one of the Trusts or
any other person intended to be protected by the Plan. In light of the
Plan's objectives, particularly its channeling provisions, the Trustees con-
cluded that this exception is limited to actions claiming injury wholly
independent of the Dalkon Shield. Accordingly, the Trust compensates
claimants for any and all injuries relating to Dalkon Shield use, even if
medical malpractice contributed to or even appears to be the primary
cause of those injuries. In other words, the Trust will not "discount"
Option 3 offers to claimants because of the existence medical of malprac-
tice by a health-care provider when the claim resulted from the use, in-
sertion, or removal of the Dalkon Shield.
On March 5, 1991, the district court held a hearing on five Motions to
Interpret Section 1.85 of the Plan and the definition of "Unreleased
Claim" contained in the Plan. By Order and Memorandum Opinion
dated August 19, 1991, the district court defined "Unreleased Claim"
based on medical malpractice. 24 According to the court, such a claim is
one in which the "Dalkon Shield may have been involved or otherwise
present in the sequence of events, but played no part in any alleged result-
ing injury, and where there is no claim for injuries compensable as Dalkon
Shield Claims." 12
Finding the district court's definition unnecessarily broad, the Fourth
Circuit reversed and remanded on this issue. 126 The court ordered the
Trust to evaluate the claims, and to determine whether it was unreleased,
based on the language in the Plan. 127
IV. THE DALKON SHIELD CLAIMANTS TRUST: A PRELIMINARY
APPRAISAL
A set of recent articles in the Duke Journal of Law and Contemporary
Problems describe the various claims resolution facilities that recently
have been established to deal with mass tort claims.'28 Nearly all of the
articles focus to some extent on the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, and
122. See Plan, supra note 1, § 8.03.
123. See id. § 8.04.
124. See Order, In re A.H. Robins Co. (No. 85-01307-R) (Aug. 19, 1991).
125. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
126. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 972 F.2d 77, 81 (4th Cir. 1992).
127. See id at 81-82.
128. See Symposium, Claims Resolution Facilities and the Mass Settlement of Mass
Torts, 53 Law & Contemp. Probs. 1 (1990).
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many are critical or inaccurate. 129
Typical criticisms are reported by Professor Francis McGovern. He
wrote of the "high level of dissatisfaction over claims processing.'
' 30
Curiously, the source of this statement was a Wall Street Journal arti-
cle131 which described two claimants' dissatisfaction with how their
claims were evaluated. McGovern wrote:
[T]his title reflects the sentiments of at least some of the participants in
the claims resolution process and suggests a high level of dissatisfac-
tion over claims processing. Commonly discussed general complaints
include a lack of willingness to compromise, a failure to reveal infor-
mation concerning the trust's evaluation of claims, an insensitivity to
the behavioral needs of claimants, and an overemphasis on administra-
tive convenience.1
3 2
There are several problems with this statement. First, "commonly dis-
cussed general complaints" by whom? Nowhere is it disclosed that many
of the chief critics of the Trust are plaintiffs' lawyers who have not been
able to influence the Trust to the degree that they had hoped. Because
the Trust is an independent body, it has not accepted wholesale the sug-
gestions of the plaintiff's bar.
133
129. The article about the Trust, written by a former Trustee (who was so identified),
contains several inaccuracies. See Kenneth R. Feinberg, The Dalkon Shield Claimants
Trust, 53 Law & Contemp. Probs. 79 (1990). For example, it contends that the success or
failure of the Trust depended on whether Option 2 was successful. See id. at 109. How-
ever, because of technical requirements of the Plan, most of the Trustees were aware that
Option 2 had limitations and would be a minor part of the settlement process. See infra
note 135 for a summary of the Trust's claims experience to date.
130. Francis E. McGovern, Foreword, Claims Resolution Facilities and the Mass Set-
tlement of Mass Torts, 53 Law & Contemp. Probs. 1, 7 (1990).
13 1. See Milo Geyelin, Dalkon Shield Trust, Hailed as Innovative, Stirs a Lot of Dis-
cord, Wall St. J., June 3, 1991, at Al. Neither this article nor another Wall Street Jour-
nal article, see Milo Geyelin & Arthur S. Hayes, Dalkon Shield Trust's Policies Attacked,
Wall St. J., Mar. 12, 1992, at B3, reflected extensive interviews with the author of this
Essay or anyone else connected with the Trust. Nor did they convey the reality that tens
of thousands of claimants are satisfied with their treatment and settlements. The Trust
treats its correspondence with claimants as confidential. Thus, it is impossible to cite the
numerous specific examples of claimant satisfaction.
132. McGovern, supra note 130, at 7.
133. The Trust often is accused of a lack of willingness to compromise with lawyers
concerning matters of Trust policy and procedure. For example, the Trust did not com-
promise on the question concerning to whom settlement checks should be made payable.
Because the Trustees knew that some represented claimants were dissatisfied with their
legal representation, and because the Trustees recognized that their primary obligation is
to claimants, not their attorneys, the Trust decided that the best course of action would
be to make checks payable to claimants. Although checks are made payable to claimants,
they are mailed to the represented claimants' attorneys, as are all other correspondences
from the Trust. Similarly, the Trust would not agree to allow lawyers access to the
Trust's computer system, which could have resulted in destroying the integrity of the
Trust's data and claimants' files. On the other hand, the Trust has received numerous
thoughtful and useful suggestions over the years. Many suggestions have been considered
carefully, and several have been implemented.
In another article in the Duke Symposium, Mark A. Peterson takes the Trust to task
for not being more flexible, or more specifically, for not working with plaintiffs' lawyers.
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Other accusations are equally problematic. While it is true that the
Trust will not provide claimants, or their lawyers, with a roadmap as to
how claims are evaluated, the Trustees have made numerous statements
about the process. For example, the Trust has informed claimants as to
what elements are considered and what elements are not considered.
Also, possible statute of limitations defenses are not considered during
the claims resolution process, while alternative causation problems are
very important.
The statements reflect a bad game of semantics. "Administrative con-
venience" is set forth as the justification for the Trust's unpopular poli-
cies. In fact, the Trust's purpose is to operate as leanly as possible to
protect the Trust's fund for distribution to claimants.
Similarly, it is difficult to understand what "insensitivity to the behav-
ioral needs of claimants" means. Each claimant is provided a Personal
Contact at the Trust who is well-trained to answer the claimant's ques-
tions about the claims resolution process. The Trust also has provided
training to each Personal Contact to insure that they can treat claimants
with dignity and empathy. In addition, any claimant who rejects her
initial offer from the Trust is entitled to a face-to-face meeting with Trust
representatives to discuss her claim in detail, and tell her story. As Karen
Hicks pointed out in her dissertation, many Dalkon Shield claimants
were just as concerned about achieving justice on a personal level as with
being appropriately compensated. 134
Much of the criticism being leveled against the Trust appears to be
designed to embarrass the Trust into more fully cooperating with those
who have much to gain: the lawyers and other professionals who person-
ally benefit if business is done in the usual adversarial fashion.
Certainly, claimants in current and future mass torts would be better
served by a reasoned and balanced evaluation of the Trust's performance
to assess what lessons have been learned and to determine whether the
Trust can serve as a paradigm. This part of this Essay attempts to pro-
vide some balance, and thus the framework for further analysis, by pro-
viding a quantitative picture of the Trust's performance to date, a
See Peterson, supra note 70, at 135. For example, Peterson states that the "trust ...
refuses to consult with or explain its policy positions to the plaintiffs' bar." Id. Appar-
ently, Mr. Peterson was not aware that the Trustees met with hundreds of Dalkon Shield
lawyers at the ATLA meetings in Boston in the summer of 1989 and in Orlando in Janu-
ary 1990. At the 1990 meeting, the major policies of the Trust were announced and
explained. In addition, the Attorney Newsletter continually announces and explains all
the Trust's major positions. See supra Part III.D.
As discussed earlier, the Trustees believed that all represented and unrepresented
claimants should be treated equally. See supra Part III.C. Accordingly, the Trustees
took great pains to provide all attorneys and claimants with the same information. The
Trustees also sought to avoid the impression or appearance that any particular attorney
had a special relationship with the Trust, as many attorneys reportedly claimed, because
the Trustees wanted all claimants to understand that they all would be subject to the
same rules and policies.
134. See Hicks, supra note 6, at 227-28.
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comparison of the Trust's performance with the Manville Trust's per-
formance, and a further response to some of the criticisms of the Trust.
A. The Trust's Performance
The following data suggests that the Trust's philosophy is working
well. About 350,000 timely and late claims have been filed. Over
106,000 of these claims were disallowed by the court in 1987 before the
bankruptcy plan was approved. Roughly 60,000 Late Claims have been
filed and will be reviewed for possible payment if there is any money
remaining after paying the nearly 200,000 timely claims.
Since the Trust began resolving claims, it has settled over 145,000
claims at a total administrative cost of under $400 per claim.135 Over
$410,800,000 has been paid to represented claimants. Thus, assuming a
one-third contingency fee rate, represented claimants have received about
$278,890,000. Unrepresented claimants have received approximately
$226,100,000. In addition, claimants are currently considering Option 3
offers totalling almost $43,000,000 in the aggregate.
At first glance, the average payment to unrepresented claimants may
appear far less than that for represented claimants. In fact, that is true,
because 116,349 unrepresented claimants have been paid, while only
25,571 represented claimants have been paid. The average payment to
unrepresented claimants must be evaluated in light of the fact that a far
higher number of unrepresented claimants chose the $725 Option 1 pay-
135. The following summarizes the Trust's claims experience to date.
Option 1 - To date, approximately 115,000, or 64%, of the timely claimants have
elected Option 1. Over 51% of foreign claimants and 65% of domestic claimants have
elected Option 1. Not surprisingly, 89% of Option 1 claimants are unrepresented.
Option 2 - Almost 16,000 claimants, or 8.5%, have elected Option 2. The Trustees
expected that Option 2 would prove to be relatively unpopular for two reasons. First, the
payment scale was relatively low. Payments ranged from $850 to $5500, depending on
the severity of the injury. The scale was low because this option was designed for plain-
tiffs with serious alternative causation problems who would have received much less, if
anything, in the traditional tort system. Second, the Plan imposed rather stringent proof
requirements. Specifically, a claimant could not elect Option 2 unless she had medical
proof of Dalkon Shield use, which many claimants with alternative causation problems
did not have. For an "Option 2" to be a more viable option for resolving more claims,
the parameters would have to be less stringent. For example, if the Trust could have
accepted non-medical proof of Dalkon Shield use, many claimants with more serious
injuries, but alternate causation problems, could have chosen Option 2 instead of Option
3. Such claimants generally receive a lower Option 3 offer than the scheduled Option 2
amount for such injury claimed because of causation issues resulting in a substantial dis-
count.
Option 3 - 44,446 (24%) Option 3 claims were filed. The Option 3 claim form is de-
tailed and requires complete medical records. Payouts under Option 3 have ranged from
$125 for claimants with no proof of Dalkon Shield use or injury to over $1,000,000 for
certain injuries, typically claims involving infertility or injury to the fetus. Unrepresented
as well as represented claimants have received six-figure offers.
Option 4 - 2,300 claimants have deferred making an election.
Option 5 - The Trust created Option 5 for those who wanted to withdraw their claims.
Over 2,100 claimants have elected Option 5.
[Vol. 61
1992] THE DALKON SHIELD CLAIMANTS TRUST 655
ment. When payments under Option 3 are examined, however, unrepre-
sented claimants are actually netting higher average amounts than the
average amounts netted by represented claimants.'
36
Moreover, the processing of claims has moved efficiently, allowing in-
jured persons to be compensated without undue delay. The Trust is pay-
ing about $1,000,000 in claims per day, and sometimes as much as
$10,000,000 per week, and will make offers on all remaining timely
claims in approximately two years.
Further, the Trust's offers of compensation appear to be perceived as
fair and just, given the acceptance rate of Option 3 offers. The accept-
ance rate on the Trust's Option 3 offers is over 82%. Taking into ac-
count those claimants who rejected their Option 3 offer but who accepted
the ADR option, the acceptance rate is approximately 85%. Moreover,
most of the rejections (approximately 60%) are by claimants who receive
offers of less than $6,000. Additionally, 37% of those claimants who
initially reject the Trust's Option 3 offer change their decision and accept
the Trust's offer after the settlement conference, at which the Trust's of-
fer is explained. Because of the high acceptance rate, the Trust has been
able to keep administrative and legal costs very low.
B. Comparison with the Manville Trust
The Trust recognizes that many Dalkon Shield claimants suffered their
injuries as long as twenty years ago and regrets any further delays in
payment. Since the Trust was fully funded in December 1989, however,
it appears that it has been able to settle more claims faster than any other
compensation system devised in the mass tort context even though Op-
tion 3 payments can be quite large and are based upon complex medical
evidence.
By comparison, the Manville Trust has made offers to claimants over a
longer period of time. The Manville Trust has reviewed approximately
28,000 claims out of 192,000 active claims in a five and one-half year
period.137 The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, on the other hand, has
processed almost 150,000 claims in four years. Many of these claims,
about 115,000, were Option 1 claims. In the two and a half years that it
has been processing the higher valued claims, the Trust has paid about
136. The Trust does not disclose average settlement amounts because it does not want
claimants to decide whether to accept their Option 3 offer based on other claimants'
experiences. However, by dividing the total amount of accepted Option 3 offers and judg-
ments obtained by the number of unrepresented claimants who have been paid and com-
paring this figure to the comparable figure for represented claimants, adjusted downward
for an assumed 30% contingency fee, the Trust's data reveal that the actual average
amount netted by represented claimants is approximately 88% of that paid to unrepre-
sented claimants.
137. See Financial Statements and Report of Manville Personal Injury Settlement
Trust for the period Ending June 30, 1992 Pursuant to Sections 3.02 (d)(ii) and (iii) of the
Trust Agreement, In re Johns-Manville Corp. (Nos. 82-B-1 1656 (BRL) through 82-1-
11676) [hereinafter Manville Trust Financial Statements].
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16,000 Option 2 claims, which require an examination of medical records
and a claim form. As of the end of October 1992, it also had made ap-
proximately 17,500 Option 3 offers, which require examination of volu-
minous medical records and a detailed claim form.
Moreover, the Manville Trust is now paying less than twenty-five cents
on the dollar due to a lack of funds.'38 In contrast, the Trust is paying
100 cents on the dollar to all claimants who accept their Option 3 offers.
Another area of comparison is administrative costs. As of June 1991,
Manville's transaction costs, including legal fees, were twenty-five times
higher than those of the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust.1 39 Manville's
administrative cost per claim was $4,900, ' ° while the Dalkon Shield
Claimants Trust's cost per claim was under $400. Although the Dalkon
Shield Claimants Trust's cost per claim is likely to rise as it enters the
litigation phase, the acceptance rate of its offers and its emphasis on cost
effectiveness should result in significantly lower transaction costs than
those of the Manville Trust.
C. Criticisms of the Trust
Curiously lacking in the criticisms of the Trust is any suggestion of a
motive for the Trustees to act against the interests of the claimants. The
fund belongs to the claimants, not the Trustees. The Trustees have only
one motive: to see the fund distributed as fairly and efficiently as
possible.
One article criticizing the Trust makes erroneous and misleading state-
ments about the Trust's holdback policy.141 The article states that if a
claimant refuses the Trust's offer and wins a larger recovery at trial or
arbitration, the Trust will pay only $10,000 at the time of judgment and
hold back the rest. This statement is inaccurate. The Trust will pay
either $10,000 or the Option 3 offer amount, whichever is higher. Thus,
if the Trust offered a woman $125,000, and she obtained a jury verdict of
$350,000, she would be paid $125,000 at the time of the judgment, and
the balance when the Trust is assured that there will be enough money to
pay all claimants their settlement amounts.
The negative impression created by this inaccuracy is compounded by
the article's misleading impression as to why the Trust has decided to
implement the "holdback" provision of the bankruptcy plan establishing
the Trust. The author states that the purpose is simply to "preserve as-
138. See In re Joint Eastern and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 916
(E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1991).
139. Manville's costs will go down significantly because Judge Weinstein has inter-
vened in that case and has imposed conditions, such as a holdback, similar to the policies
adopted by the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust. See id. at 905-08.
140. This calculation can be made by comparing the number of settled claims to the
Trust's financial statements. See Manville Trust Financial Statements, supra note 137.
141. See Geyelin & Hayes, supra note 131, at B3.
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sets." 42 In fact, the purpose of the "holdback" is to ensure that all
claimants receive a fair proportion of the $2.3 billion settlement fund.
Indeed, it would be a gross violation of the Trust's fiduciary duty to the
entire claimant population to risk bankrupting the fund by paying large
sums to those at the head of the line when that might mean there is no
money for those at the end of the line.
The article also ignores another fundamental point. Every single
penny of the Trust fund, except those needed for administrative expenses,
will be distributed to claimants. Any money left over after all settlement
judgments and late claimants are paid, will be distributed to all claimants
on a pro rata basis. By making fair offers to claimants and by creating
the incentive to settle now by paying claimants the full amount of the
offer, the Trust saves huge amounts in transaction costs by avoiding addi-
tional attorneys fees and other defense costs. If all or most claimants
accepted their settlement offers, there would be substantially more
money to be distributed on a pro rata basis. 143
Finally, if the Trust is prohibited from implementing the "holdback"
in the manner in which it has decided is in the best interests of the claim-
ant population as a whole, it will be forced to hold back some amount of
its Option 3 settlement offers. Why should claimants who want to settle,
some of whom have been waiting since the early 1970s, have to wait
another minute to receive their entire settlement because of a relatively
small number of claimants who wish to litigate their claims? Why
should the majority who want to settle get only 12%, 25%, or 50%, or
some other portion now, to preserve assets for the minority who want to
litigate?
Indeed, the Trust's policies are designed to achieve a resolution of all
claims in the shortest possible period of time. If more claimants were to
elect trial or arbitration, rather than to settle at Option 3, the Trust
would be in business for a far longer time. Thus, the Trust's policies
which provide incentives to settle, rather than to litigate, should result in
the Trust going out of business sooner rather than later.'"
The question, once again, is one of control: who should make the ulti-
mate decisions concerning the distribution of the fund? It seems perfectly
obvious that those who are in business to give all the money away are in
142. Id.
143. Obviously, a rational economic actor may not want to sacrifice the possible "ex-
tra" share obtained by trial or arbitration in order to insure additional payments to other
claimants. But there is certainly nothing wrong with seeking to establish a model in
which altruism could pay dividends. This is why the Trust's policies need to be examined
from the law and economics and feminist jurisprudence perspectives. See supra notes 16-
27 and accompanying text
144. This fact tends to disprove the suggestion that the Trustees have an incentive to
stay in business for the purpose of earning fees for as long as possible. See Sobol, supra
note 29, at 330. The Trustees could have adopted policies designed to prolong the pro-
cess. Instead, they chose policies, such as paying settlement amounts in full and the
holdback, which are designed to encourage early settlement.
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the best position to make decisions to protect the interests of the whole.
They certainly are in a better position to make these sorts of decisions
than those who want to maximize individual recoveries and who have a
financial stake in those recoveries.
CONCLUSION
The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust was established to compensate
women and their families who were injured by the Dalkon Shield. Sev-
eral factors should be considered when analyzing the performance of the
Trust. First, the Trust made serious and exhaustive attempts to insure a
high degree of claimant satisfaction with its claims resolution process.145
Second, the Trust has operated on a lean administrative budget, hold-
ing total administrative costs to under $400 per claim. Moreover, in the
typical tort case, the defendant's costs consume about 35% of the litiga-
tion expense and recovery pie. After plaintiffs' attorneys take approxi-
mately 35%, plaintiffs are left with roughly 30%. In contrast, a Dalkon
Shield claimant can expect to receive about 65% of the amount offered if
she is represented by a lawyer, or 100% less approximately $400 if she
represents herself.
The fact that women were the primary victims in the Dalkon Shield
case motivated many of the Trustees' decisions. These decisions and the
success of the CRF have serious implications for resolving claims of wo-
men and other traditionally less powerful persons, or for any victims of a
mass tort. When disaster strikes along the lines of the Dalkon Shield,
asbestos, etc., there will eventually be millions or billions of dollars at
stake. The question should be how to distribute the most money to the
victims in such a way that the victims feel that justice has been served.
Only Tom Tyler's article141 in the Duke Symposium focused on this mat-
145. Examples of these attempts include the following. The Trust's claims evaluation
rules were tested by a large group of experienced Dalkon Shield plaintiffs' lawyers.
Moreover, because at the time the Trust was developing the Option 3 claims form, ap-
proximately 60% of Dalkon Shield claimants were not represented by lawyers, the Trust
tested its claims evaluation forms with members of claimants groups from all socio-eco-
nomic and educational backgrounds. See supra Part III.C. The Trust also developed a
program designed to help claimants obtain their medical records from doctors or hospi-
tals who refused to release them to the claimants. See id. Furthermore, the Trust ab-
sorbed the cost of translating into English the medical records of foreign claimants who
were unable to do so themselves. There are other policies too numerous to mention here
that are designed to assist claimants whenever possible during the claims resolution part
of the process. See supra Part III.C-D.
Each of the Trust's claims evaluation experts either served on the Claimants Commit-
tee during the bankruptcy estimation proceeding or worked for the leading law firm rep-
resenting Dalkon Shield claimants in pre-petition litigation. See supra Part III.A.3.
Finally, at conferences for plaintiffs' lawyers and in our written communications to
claimants, the Trustees have explained the basis for each of their policies and have been
receptive to suggestions that would be helpful to the claimant population as a whole. See
supra Part III.D.
146. See Tom R. Tyler, A Psychological Perspective on the Settlement of Mass Tort
Claims, 53 Law & Contemp. Probs. 199, 203-05 (1990).
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ter of deep concern to the Trustees. It was always the Trustees' view that
claimants were concerned not simply with money, but also with dignity
and justice.
The Trust believes, as does the law and economics scholarship, that
the claimants are in the best position to make their own choices concern-
ing settlement options if they receive accurate information about the pro-
cess and if no special expertise is required to complete the process.' 47 To
further maximize each claimant's position, the Trust relies on the sub-
missions of each claimant and then subjects each claimant's materials to
the same claims evaluation process. This creates an efficient system that
protects the good of the whole, arguably a goal in accordance with femi-
nist philosophy.
The operation of the Trust can further bridge the gap between the law
and economics school and feminist jurisprudence. 4 Both law and eco-
nomics and feminist jurisprudentialists should agree that the Trust serves
as an example of the need to create new ways of looking at legal problems
to ensure their just resolution. There is a need to re-examine notions of
individual prerogatives, sometimes forsaking them for more collective,
and efficient, resolution.'49
Reliance on a law and economics perspective may seem "sterile,"'
however, or lacking in feminist values of care. For instance, Professor
Bender suggests that
[I]n the Dalkon Shield cases, corporate defendants might be ordered
by law to fulfill their care-giving responsibilities by finding openings in
infertility clinics for victims, arranging their appointments and trans-
portation for the necessary visits, organizing necessary clinics if what
already exists is inadequate, locating competent marriage and psycho-
logical counseling, developing private adoption alternatives for those
women who want children but cannot conceive, and the like.15 '
These suggestions are valuable. In addition, however, there are other
ways to demonstrate this care-giving ethic through a claims evaluation
process. By ensuring such qualities as timely and fair processing of
claims, effective communication lines between the Trust and the claim-
ants, staff members willing to assist claimants, and settlement confer-
ences whereby the Trust explains to a claimant, face-to-face, the
strengths and weaknesses of her claim, the Trust is, in fact, able to act in
a caring, responsive manner while still preserving efficiency in claims res-
olution and administrative operation.
147. See Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L
Rev. 659, 682 (1989) ("[Claimants] self-select the optimal combination of price and trans-
action costs.").
148. See Minda, supra note 25, at 646-50 (discussing similarities and differences of the
law and economics, feminist, and Critical Legal Studies movements).
149. See id. at 648.
150. See West, supra note 17, at 1450.
151. Leslie Bender, Changing the Values in Tort Law, 25 Tulsa LJ. 759, 772 n.26
(1990).
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In sum, the Trust encountered resistance to its policies1 52 because the
system devised to implement the Plan differs significantly from the tradi-
tional adversarial model. Those who historically have had much to gain
in mass tort cases-namely, lawyers and other professionals-would lose
much of their power if the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust succeeds in its
goal of distributing the settlement fund as fairly and efficiently as
possible.
It is indeed likely that, without court involvement in future cases, the
claims resolution paradigm the Trustees hoped to create may well be lost.
It is unlikely that those who have much to lose would agree to another
Plan, like the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust Plan, which provides the
tools with which independent trustees can seek to protect the interests of
a whole class of claimants.
This Essay raises numerous questions and presents the factual and
conceptual materials that provide the basis for beginning a reasoned and
academic discussion of all the issues presented by the Dalkon Shield case,
as well as other mass torts. Further articles by this author, and hopefully
by her colleagues, wcan explore fully the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust
experience from the three jurisprudential perspectives discussed earlier in
this Essay-professional ethics, feminist jurisprudence, and law and eco-
nomics. 153 Perhaps then we will know whether the Dalkon Shield
Claimants Trust represents a paradigm lost or found.
152. See, e.g., Geyelin, supra note 131, at Al (contending that claimants complain that
Trust officials are tightfisted and secretive); Geyelin & Hayes, supra note 131, at B3
(claimants charge they were forced to accept unfair settlements); Ruth Richman, Dalkon
Shield Fund Unfair, Critics Say, Chi. Trib., June 30, 1991, Womannews, at 1 (contending
that claimants complain that Option 3 Settlements have been secretive, unfair and
confusing).
153. See supra notes 8-27 and accompanying text.
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